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STATE V. BUDA: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT,  
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, AND  
“TESTIMONIAL” COMPETENCE 
Andrew Darcy∗ 
 
The last temptation is the greatest of treason: To do the right 
deed for the wrong reason.
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“‘Dad says nobody beat me.  I fell when I was sleeping in my 
room.’”
2
  A three-year-old child, N.M.,
3
 made this statement to a New 
Jersey Division of Youth Services (DYFS) employee, Miriam Nuru-
deen, while hospitalized for injuries apparently sustained from physi-
cal abuse.
4
  Nurudeen recounted his statements to a jury in a criminal 
trial against Ryan Buda—the boyfriend of N.M.’s mother, Christine, 
whom N.M. regularly called “Dad” or “Daddy.”
5
  The jury convicted 
Buda on three counts of endangering the welfare of a child and one 
count of aggravated assault.
6
  N.M. did not testify at Buda’s trial, and 
the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should not have 
permitted Nurudeen to relay N.M.’s statements to the jury.
7
  Buda 
claimed that the trial court’s decision to admit those statements into 
evidence violated the right afforded to him by the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which states that “[i]n all criminal 
 
 ∗ J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Fordham Universi-
ty.  I would like to thank my family and friends, the members of the Seton Hall Law 
Review, especially Keerthi Mundrati and Andrew Boulay, and Professor D. Michael 
Risinger for their guidance, encouragement, and critique during the writing process. 
 1 T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 44 (1988). 
 2 State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 766 (N.J. 2008). 
 3 To protect the privacy of the child, his mother’s surname is omitted from the 
opinion, and the court refers to the child by his initials.  Id. at 765. 
 4 Id. at 766.  While the defendant formally protested his innocence at trial, the 
actus reus was not a practically triable issue—that is, it was virtually certain that 
N.M.’s injuries had been sustained by physical abuse.  See infra note 113 and accom-
panying text. 
 5 Buda, 949 A.2d at 765. 
 6 Id. at 768. 
 7 Id.; see infra note 124 and accompanying text.   
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prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”
8
  On appeal, the Appellate Division of 
the New Jersey Superior Court dismissed some of Buda’s claims but 
agreed that Nurudeen’s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause 
and, therefore, reversed and remanded the case.
9
  Subsequently, both 
Buda and the State petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for cer-
tification.
10
  The supreme court accepted the case and affirmed his 
conviction, holding in a four-to-three decision that the defendant’s 
confrontation right had not been violated.
11
 
The issue before the Buda court—the admission of N.M.’s out-of-
court statements—implicated both evidentiary hearsay rules and the 
rights afforded to a criminal defendant by the Sixth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.
12
  Both are closely related in some aspects; most 
notably, they both prohibit some out-of-court statements from being 
admitted into evidence.
13
  In a 2004 case, Crawford v. Washington,
14
 the 
Supreme Court of the United States directed lower courts to radically 
alter the way in which they had been analyzing the relationship be-
tween hearsay and the Confrontation Clause for the previous quarter 
century.
15
  In Crawford, the Court gave the somewhat elusive directive 
that the Confrontation Clause should not apply to all hearsay but on-
ly to those statements made by “witnesses.”
16
  The identifying act of a 
 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 9 See State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 949 A.2d 
761 (N.J. 2008).   
 10 Buda, 949 A.2d at 769.  A petition for certification is a request that the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court review the final judgment of the appellate division.  See Supreme 
Court of N.J., Guide to Filing an Appeal in Supreme Court, 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/guide.htm#petitioncert (last visited May 
19, 2010).  The defendant cross-petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court because 
the appellate division decided that other incriminating statements that N.M. made to 
his mother would be admissible into evidence on remand.  See Buda, 912 A.2d at 740.  
These issues are not the focus of this Comment. 
 11 Buda, 949 A.2d at 780. 
 12 Id. at 770. 
 13 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (“[H]earsay rules and the 
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values . . . .”); see also 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (“It seems apparent that the Sixth Amend-
ment’s Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same 
roots.”). 
 14 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 15 See infra Part II for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence and, specifically, how the Crawford decision changed the Court’s 
longstanding approach.   
 16 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
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witness is the making of a so-called “testimonial” statement, and thus, 
only witnesses make “testimonial” statements while other out-of-court 
declarants do not.
17
  The Court stated that “testimonial” hearsay is in-
admissible at a criminal trial unless the following two circumstances 
are met: the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defense 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
18
 
In a later case, Davis v. Washington,
19
 the Court elaborated on the 
definition of “testimonial” as it applies to statements made in re-
sponse to police “interrogations.”
20
  The Court held that statements 
made in response to a police interrogation that is aimed at eliciting 
 
 17 Id.  The author has placed quotation marks around the word testimonial 
throughout this Comment because, as will be discussed infra Part V.B, the meaning 
of testimonial in the Crawford sense is still not perfectly clear.  Despite Crawford’s de-
pendence on historical sources, the word testimonial was not used in the framing era 
as a description of a type of hearsay.  See Thomas Y. Davies, Not “‘The Framers’ Design”: 
How the Framing-era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimoni-
al” Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 369 
(2007).  Furthermore, in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court explained that 
testimonial evidence refers to communicative evidence or assertions made by a hu-
man being.  Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966); see also Pennsylvania 
v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 591 (1990) (distinguishing “real or physical” evidence from 
“testimonial” evidence); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 201 (1988) (“[I]n order 
to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, re-
late a factual assertion or disclose information.”).  Crawford and its progeny have giv-
en “testimonial” a very different, much narrower meaning, and thus, the quotation 
marks are meant to signify the phrase “testimonial in the Crawford sense”—a phrase 
that, if regularly used, would make this Comment inordinately awkward.  
 18 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.   
 19 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 20 Id.  The Court stated in Crawford that it was using the word “interrogation” in 
its colloquial sense.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.  Interrogation was an odd word 
choice to describe the dialogue in Davis.  A police interrogation has a very specific 
meaning—namely a systematic, planned series of questions initiated by the police 
seeking inculpatory information from a criminal suspect to secure a conviction 
against him at a later trial.  See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 11, 22 (2008); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (8th ed. 2004) (“The for-
mal or systematic questioning of a person; esp., intensive questioning by the police, 
usu. of a person arrested for or suspected of committing a crime.”).  When police 
conduct interrogations they usually use psychological tactics and strategies designed 
to secure a confession from the suspect.  See LEO, supra, at 119.   A police interview, 
on the other hand, is a distinct manner of questioning reserved for the innocent, 
such as victims and witnesses.  Id. at 22.  Labeling the dialogue in Davis as an interro-
gation becomes even more perplexing because the Court had previously stated that 
an interrogation is usually initiated by the police.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444 (1966) (defining an interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981) (noting that 
if a suspect had initiated communication with the police, no “interrogation” would 
occur). 
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past facts relevant to a criminal prosecution are “testimonial,” whe-
reas statements are “non-testimonial” when the purpose of the inter-
rogation is to resolve an ongoing emergency.
21
 
The Crawford and Davis opinions can be problematic for prose-
cutors of child abuse.  For example, in New Jersey, DYFS workers are 
required to investigate allegations of child abuse by interviewing the 
victim,
22
 and the investigator may elicit statements from the child that 
have probative evidentiary value for the criminal prosecution of the 
abuser.  The prosecution’s case against the defendant may hinge on 
the admission of those statements into evidence, especially because 
for several reasons, a child may not testify at trial to repeat his state-
ments to the jury firsthand.
23
  Furthermore, there is often little other 
evidence against the accused besides the child’s pretrial statement.
24
  
Therefore, if a court determines that the child’s pretrial statement is 
“testimonial,” then admitting that statement into evidence would be 
constitutionally impermissible,
25
 which could seriously hamper the 
prosecution’s case. 
It is unclear whether the State would have been able to prove 
that Buda was the perpetrator of the apparent abuse beyond a rea-
sonable doubt without N.M.’s statements, and thus, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court was faced with a situation similar to the one de-
scribed above.  This Comment argues that the Buda majority came to 
the right conclusion—that N.M.’s statements were not “testimoni-
al”—but for the wrong reasons.  Specifically, the Buda majority me-
chanistically applied the holding of Davis in a manner unintended by 
 
 21 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  As will be discussed in more 
detail infra Part V.B, the Court gave other indications about how a “testimonial” 
statement can be identified—criteria that some have criticized as being vague and 
inconsistent.  See, e.g., Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: ‘Testimony’ Does Not 
Mean Testimony and ‘Witness’ Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 
169–70 (2006). 
 22 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:129-2.5(b) (2009) (“The child protective investigator 
shall interview the alleged child victim in person and individually . . . .”). 
 23 See Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confron-
tation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 985–92 (2007) (discussing the 
various ways in which courts find children to be incompetent or unavailable). 
 24 See State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1334 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) 
(“For obvious reasons, only one witness with personal knowledge is available to prove 
the State’s case in almost every child abuse prosecution: the child victim.”).   
 25 See, e.g., State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 325 (Md. 2005) (finding statements 
made by a child to a health and human services employee to be “testimonial” and 
inadmissible); State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 
949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).  
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the U.S. Supreme Court.  This Comment contends that the Buda 
court could have justified its result by explaining that confrontation 
was not required because N.M. lacked the competency to make a “tes-
timonial” statement—that is, N.M. lacked the mental ability to be an 
extrajudicial witness as described in Crawford.  The making of a “tes-
timonial” statement requires the declarant to objectively understand 
that his statement could be used in a criminal prosecution.  Given 
N.M.’s age, mental development, and unfamiliarity with the judicial 
system, he likely would not have been able to understand that his an-
swers to Nurudeen’s questions could or might be used to convict Bu-
da.
26
 
In Part II, this Comment gives a brief explanation of the hearsay 
rules as they relate to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.  
Part III reviews of the factual background, procedural history, and 
majority opinion of the Buda case.  Part IV analyzes the majority’s ap-
proach and reasoning.  Part V summarizes the criteria necessary to 
 
 26 The idea of extrajudicial “testimonial” competency has been raised both expli-
citly and implicitly by judges and commentators, and the author agrees that it is the 
most persuasive argument supporting the theory that some very young children, such 
as N.M., are unable to make “testimonial” statements.  See Rebecca K. Connally, “Out 
of the Mouth[s] of Babes”: Can Young Children Even Bear Testimony?, ARMY LAW., Mar. 
2008, at 1, 18–19 (noting that “[s]ome young children are incapable of making tes-
timonial statements because they either lack the competency or capacity to ‘bear wit-
ness’”); Matthew M. Staab, Child’s Play: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Crawford v. Washington 
in Child Abuse Prosecution, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 501, 522 (2005) (“[I]t is doubtful wheth-
er a trial court could find, on one hand, that a child is incompetent to testify at trial 
but, on the other hand, that the same child at an earlier time could make a testi-
monial statement which he reasonably believed could be used at a future trial.”).  
Some courts, without referring specifically to the phrase “testimonial” competency, 
have touched on the issue.  See, e.g., State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255–56 
(Minn. 2006) (“[G]iven [the child’s] very young age, it is doubtful that he was even 
capable of understanding that his statements would be used at a trial. . . .  [C]hildren 
of [a very young age] are simply unable to understand the legal system and the con-
sequences of statements made during the legal process. . . .  An interview with an 
older child who understands the law-enforcement consequences of his statement, or 
an interview with more significant law-enforcement involvement might both exhibit a 
greater purpose on the part of a declarant or government questioner to produce 
statements for use at a future trial.”).   Professor Richard D. Friedman, who helped 
spark the Crawford Court’s decision to overturn Roberts, proposed the idea that very 
young children were incapable of acting as witnesses because they would not be 
aware at the time they made the statements that their words would lead to the pu-
nishment of the abuser.  See Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Con-
frontation, and Hearsay, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 250 (2002) [hereinafter 
Friedman, Conundrum]; see also Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of 
“Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272 (2005) (noting that “some very young child-
ren should be considered incapable of being witnesses for Confrontation Clause 
purposes”).    
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make a “testimonial” statement and then explains what those criteria 
indicate about “testimonial” competency.  Specifically, “testimonial” 
competency requires that the declarant have the mental ability to in-
fer from the circumstances that his statement could be used in a 
criminal prosecution.  In the Buda case, N.M. was unable to do so.  
Part VI suggests a procedure that should be followed for child-abuse 
prosecutions that would protect children and ensure a fair trial for 
the defendant.  This Comment concludes by placing the Buda deci-
sion into perspective with the state of the law on child hearsay and 
the Confrontation Clause.  It also calls for more definitive guidance 
from the Supreme Court about how this issue should be handled in 
the future. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Relationship Between Hearsay and the Right to Confrontation 
In criminal trials, two issues become relevant when the prosecu-
tion attempts to introduce an out-of-court statement made by a decla-
rant who is not present to testify.  First, an extrajudicial statement 
may be considered hearsay, which is defined as a “statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
27
  
The general rule is that hearsay is inadmissible at trial.
28
  While the 
origins of the hearsay rule are somewhat unclear—in fact, there was 
no established rule against it in criminal practice until the 1700s
29
—
two generally accepted reasons are given as to why the hearsay rule 
was established: (1) a preference for live testimony under oath and 
(2) subjecting the witness to cross-examination.
30
 
 
 27 FED. R. EVID. 801.  For purposes of this Comment, the author will refer and cite 
mainly to the Federal Rules of Evidence and at times to the New Jersey Rules of Evi-
dence.  Hearsay can be distinguished from statements that are not used to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted but are offered for some other reason, such as proving 
the statement’s effect on a person.  See id. advisory committee’s note (“If the signific-
ance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised 
as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.”).     
 28 Id. 802; N.J.R.E. 802.  The hearsay rule is concededly riddled with exceptions.  
See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 806; see also infra notes 31–34.  
 29 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 242 (2003).  
 30 See id. at 245–47 (citing several treatises that indicate that the rationale for hav-
ing a hearsay rule shifted from a desire for testimony under oath to the need for 
cross-examination). 
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In the federal system and in the states, however, several excep-
tions to the hearsay rule permit the prosecution to admit a statement 
made by a person not present to testify at trial.
31
  The New Jersey 
Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence divide hearsay 
exceptions into two categories: (1) those applicable regardless of the 
declarant’s availability to testify at trial and (2) those applicable only 
when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial.
32
  The former set 
of exceptions is premised on the grounds that they “possess circums-
tantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduc-
tion of the declarant in person at the trial.”
33
  The unavailable witness 
exceptions follow the theory that, although live testimony is pre-
ferred, the circumstances under which the out-of-court statement was 
made meets a certain guarantee of reliability.
34
 
In addition to the hearsay rules of evidence, a prosecutor may al-
so face a constitutional challenge to the admission of an extrajudicial 
statement.  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”
35
  The Confrontation Clause is a right granted to crimi-
nal defendants with the purpose of determining the truth at trial by 
discouraging perjury by prosecution witnesses who, for one reason or 
another, would not be able to lie (effectively) in front of the defen-
dant.  Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause entitles the defendant 
to hear the all of the prosecution’s evidence against him and provides 
him an opportunity for cross-examination.
36
  While these may be the 
goals of confrontation, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
there is scant firsthand proof of how the Framers intended the 
amendment to operate in practice,
37
 and as a result, several interpre-
tations exist. 
For example, one extreme reading of the clause is that the con-
frontation right has no relation to hearsay statements at all and that 
 
 31 See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804; N.J.R.E. 803, 804.   
 32 See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804; N.J.R.E. 803, 804.   
 33 FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. 
 34 Id. 804 advisory committee’s note. 
 35 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 36 See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 
688–89 (1996).  
 37 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause.”).   
DARCY (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2010  6:14 PM 
1176 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1169 
 
the phrase “witnesses against” refers only to witnesses who actually 
testify at trial.
38
  Under this reading, the clause simply requires that a 
criminal defendant be present during an adverse witness’s testimo-
ny;
39
 it would not affect the admission of an out-of-court statement.  
While the Court has rejected this interpretation, it has also rejected 
the opposite extreme—that the Confrontation Clause was simply a 
constitutional prohibition of all hearsay from criminal trials.
40
  Be-
cause the Court has determined that hearsay rules and the Confron-
tation Clause are neither completely distinct nor identical, it has at-
tempted to explain that there will be some situations in which the 
prosecution will need to pass two obstacles before it can admit a hear-
say statement into evidence: the evidentiary hearsay rule and a consti-
tutional Confrontation Clause challenge.  While the prosecution will 
always need to find an evidentiary exception to admit hearsay into 
evidence, there will also be some situations in which a defendant rais-
es a constitutional challenge that can be overcome only if the prose-
cution can demonstrate that the admission of the statement will not 
violate the Confrontation Clause.
41
  As discussed below, the Supreme 
Court has struggled to establish a clear and long-lasting rule to ex-
plain which hearsay statements are subject to the constitutional ob-
stacle. 
 
 38 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 39 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice 
Harlan stated, 
     If one were to translate the Confrontation Clause into language in 
more common use today, it would read: “In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to be present and to cross-examine 
the witnesses against him.”  Nothing in this language or in its 18th-
century equivalent would connote a purpose to control the scope of 
the rules of evidence.  The language is particularly ill-chosen if what 
was intended was a prohibition on the use of any hearsay . . . . 
Id. 
 40  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (holding that the Confrontation 
Clause was not meant to prohibit all hearsay, as such an interpretation “would abro-
gate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too 
extreme”); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth 
Amendment’s core concerns.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986) (recognizing that a co-
conspirator’s statement was properly admitted under a hearsay exception but could 
not be admitted into evidence because it would violate the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation). 
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B Roberts and its Effect on Child-Abuse Prosecutions 
In a 1980 case, Ohio v. Roberts,
42
 fifteen years after the Confronta-
tion Clause was made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment,
43
 the Supreme Court established a test for lower courts 
to apply when determining whether a hearsay statement could be 
admitted into evidence without violating the Confrontation Clause.
44
  
The Court stated, 
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination 
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing 
that he is unavailable.  Even then, his statement is admissible only 
if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.”  Reliability can be in-
ferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception.  In other cases, the evidence 
must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.
45
 
Roberts and its progeny established two important points about 
the Court’s understanding of the Confrontation Clause.  First, the 
Court seems to have construed the Confrontation Clause’s words 
“witnesses against” to include all hearsay declarants.
46
  Second, the 
opinion strengthened the relationship between evidentiary hearsay 
rules and the Sixth Amendment; as long as a statement fell into a 
“firmly rooted”
47
 hearsay exception or proved to be trustworthy, it 
could be admitted without any constitutional violation. 
 
 42 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 43 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 44 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
 45 Id. at 46.  The Court later clarified in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), 
and White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), that under Roberts, the Confrontation 
Clause did not require a showing of unavailability as a condition of admitting some 
hearsay statements into evidence. 
 46 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (stat-
ing in a Roberts-era case that “a declarant [is] undoubtedly as much a ‘witness against’ 
a defendant as one who actually testifies at trial”). 
 47 The Roberts court did not define the term “firmly rooted,” but it did give the 
following examples of such exceptions: dying declarations, previously cross-examined 
former testimony, and appropriately administered business and public records.  Ro-
berts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.  But without a concrete definition or set of criteria for de-
termining “firmly rooted” exceptions, lower courts subsequently struggled to identify 
them.  See Stanley A. Goldman, Not So “Firmly Rooted”: Exceptions to the Confrontation 
Clause, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3, 11–16 (1987) (criticizing the label of “firmly rooted” and 
discussing lower courts’ various interpretations of the term).  Adding to the confu-
sion is the fact that one of the Court’s given examples, properly administered busi-
ness records, was not recognized at common law and has its origins in the Common-
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Subsequent to the Roberts decision, prosecutors were able to by-
pass both the evidentiary and constitutional impediments to admit-
ting children’s hearsay by using residual hearsay exceptions,
48
 newly 
formed “tender-years” hearsay exceptions,
49
 and other hearsay excep-
tions that had sufficient indicia of reliability.
50
  The ability to admit 
children’s pretrial statements proved beneficial to child-abuse prose-
cutors because those statements were often very important for a suc-
cessful prosecution.  The statements’ importance is due to the fact 
that, frequently, the child victim is the only individual other than the 
abuser who has firsthand knowledge about the abuse, making the 
child’s information an essential piece of evidence.
51
  Moreover, a 
child may potentially be prevented from testifying at trial for two rea-
 
wealth Fund Act of 1927, a year not too long ago.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory 
committee’s note.   
 48 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807 (“A statement not specifically covered by [another 
hearsay exception] but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the state-
ment is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on 
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and 
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evi-
dence.”). 
 49 Tender-years exceptions are defined as “hearsay exception[s] for an out-of-
court statement [of a young child], usually describing an act of physical or sexual 
abuse, when the child is unavailable to testify and the court determines that the time, 
content, and circumstances of the statement make it reliable.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 790 (9th ed. 2009).  New Jersey was one of many states that passed a ten-
der-years hearsay exception.  See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) (stating that “[a] statement by a 
child under the age of 12 relating to sexual misconduct committed with or against 
that child is admissible in a criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding if” certain elements 
of reliability are met).  The age of “tender years” must be distinguished from both 
the age of legal infancy, or minority, and the age at which it is unlikely a child would 
be competent to testify.  A minor is a person who has not yet reached the full legal 
age of majority, which is usually eighteen.  See 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 10 (2000).  The 
age of “tender years” is younger than the legal age of infancy, usually ten or twelve.  
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 81 
(West, Westlaw through ch. 30 of 2010 2nd Ann. Sess.); N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).  Some 
states have a rebuttable age of presumed incompetency and others have no presump-
tive age but set forth guidelines for courts to use in determining competency.  See 
generally 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses §§ 203, 204, 208–211 (2004).   
 50 See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (holding that no confrontation 
violation occurred by admitting a child’s hearsay statements under a spontaneous-
declaration hearsay exception and a medical-treatment exception because they were 
sufficiently reliable). 
 51 See State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 672 (N.J. 1988) (“Courts, legislatures, and 
commentators that have focused on the problems of proof in child sex abuse prose-
cutions appear to agree that testimony by the victim is often the indispensable ele-
ment of the prosecution’s case.”). 
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sons: First, the court can excuse a child from testifying if it finds the 
child is unavailable due to the potential trauma he may face as a re-
sult of giving testimony in front of the alleged abuser.
52
  In addition, 
the child must be formally competent to testify,
53
 and if he is not, the 
court will preclude the child from giving testimony.
54
  Under Roberts, 
however, even if the child did not testify, prosecutors still were able to 
admit the child’s extrajudicial statement if the court found that it met 
 
 52 See, e.g., T.P. v. State, 911 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Rangel v. 
State, 199 S.W.3d 523, 529–32 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding six-year-old child to be un-
available because giving courtroom testimony would be too traumatic).  Some com-
mentators make the argument that requiring a child to repeat accounts of the abuse, 
especially in front of the abuser, can be detrimental to the child’s psychological well-
being and can result in unreliable testimony.  See Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, 
Note, Videotaping Children’s Testimony: An Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809, 820–21 
(1987) (noting that the fear of confronting an abuser and the hostility of the cour-
troom can have long-lasting effects on the child and may lead to inaccurate cour-
troom testimony).  But equally dangerous consequences can result from admitting 
unreliable children’s hearsay.  Studies have shown that children can be very suscepti-
ble to the suggestiveness of the interviewer.  See Amye R. Warren & Dorothy F. Marsil, 
Why Children’s Suggestibility Remains a Serious Concern, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 
127–31 (2002).  In addition, young children have been found to make false accusa-
tions of abuse when an interviewer gives the children positive reinforcement for 
some answers but not others, and children also may make false accusations when al-
leged victims speak with one another and share information about the alleged abuse.  
Id. at 131–32.  During the Roberts era, several infamous examples of cases were de-
cided where the manner of pretrial questioning of children was found to be unduly 
suggestive or coercive, including the New Jersey case, State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 
(N.J. 1994).  In Michaels, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a defendant’s con-
viction for sexual abuse because the investigators had asked the potential child-
victims leading questions.  Id. at 1383.  The investigators also furnished information 
to the children that the children had not voluntarily offered.  Id. at 1380.  Another 
infamous example of a problematic/suggestive interview is the California “McMartin 
Preschool case.”  Satz v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1525 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).  
These are two notorious examples, and undoubtedly, numerous other cases exist in 
which the investigation was coercive and suggestive, leading to false or inaccurate ac-
cusations that were used in a criminal trial. 
 53 See N.J.R.E. 601; 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 201 (2004).  The word “testimonial-
ly” could have been used in place of the word “formally” because competency is a 
measure of a person’s ability to testify or give testimony.  To avoid confusion with the 
term “testimonial” in the Crawford sense, the author has chosen to use the word 
“formal” to refer to a witness’s competence to give testimony at trial.  See supra note 
17.  
 54 See, e.g., State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1987) (ruling that a three-year-old did 
not understand the duty to tell the truth, thus making her incompetent to testify).  
Courts apply a number of factors when determining the formal competence of a wit-
ness, including the witness’s ability to understand the oath or affirmation to speak 
the truth and the witness’s ability to communicate with the jury.  See N.J.R.E. 601.  
This element of competency is discussed in more detail infra Part V.A. 
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certain guarantees of trustworthiness,
55
 which essentially mitigated 
the effect of a nontestifying child. 
C. The Crawford Decision 
In 2004 the Supreme Court dramatically changed its Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington.
56
  In Crawford, 
the Court eschewed the Roberts reliability framework and articulated a 
new approach to the Confrontation Clause’s relationship to hearsay.  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first attacked the Roberts rule as 
being unpredictable, overly subjective, and unfaithful to the Framers’ 
intent.
57
  He then explained that the term “witnesses,” as it is used in 
the Sixth Amendment, refers only to those individuals who make “tes-
timonial”
58
 statements and that other hearsay declarants—those who 
do not make “testimonial” statements—are not witnesses for Con-
frontation Clause purposes.
59
  Consequently, if a hearsay statement is 
“nontestimonial,” it can be admitted via a hearsay exception without 
violating the defendant’s confrontation rights; however, if the hearsay 
statement is “testimonial,” it can only be admitted if the witness is 
present on the witness stand, or (1) the declarant is unavailable to 
testify at trial and (2) the defendant has had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness.
60
 
Crawford was significant for several reasons.  First, it considerably 
narrowed the scope of the Confrontation Clause by limiting its reach 
to declarants making “testimonial” statements—a much smaller sam-
ple of hearsay declarants than the Court’s previous jurisprudence, 
 
 55 See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.   
 56 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 57 Id. at 61–65.  Justice Thomas, who was joined by Justice Scalia, voiced his dis-
pleasure with the Roberts framework in his concurring opinion in White v. Illinois, 
where he “respectfully suggest[ed] that, in an appropriate case, we reconsider how 
the phrase ‘witness against’ in the Confrontation Clause pertains to the admission of 
hearsay.”  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366 (1992). (Thomas, J., concurring).  The 
Crawford Court seems to have been partially influenced by the writings of Professor 
Richard Friedman.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (citing Richard Friedman, Confronta-
tion: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998)).  Professor Friedman sug-
gested in this article that the Court adopt a new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
using an “alternative approach, detached from hearsay law and based instead on the 
idea that the Confrontation Clause gives the defendant a right to confront adverse 
witnesses—those who make testimonial statements.”  Richard Friedman, Confronta-
tion: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1013 (1998). 
 58 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; see supra note 17.   
 59 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 68. 
 60 Id. at 68.  
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which considered all hearsay declarants to be witnesses for Confron-
tation Clause purposes.
61
  Second, Crawford extricated the Confronta-
tion Clause from evidentiary hearsay rules.
62
  The Roberts rule, which 
married the reasons that would permit a statement to be admissible 
for evidentiary purposes with the reasons why it would be admissible 
for constitutional purposes,
63
 would no longer control whether a 
hearsay statement violates the Confrontation Clause; as the Court 
proclaimed, “[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not 
think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection 
to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous no-
tions of ‘reliability.’”
64
  After Crawford, therefore, lower courts were di-
rected to no longer consider the reliability of a hearsay statement 
when deciding whether the Constitution prohibited its admission but 
rather to consider only its “testimonial” nature.
65
 
A third salient point about Crawford is that it emphasized that the 
Confrontation Clause was not aimed at admitting substantively relia-
ble evidence but was rather concerned with the procedure by which 
the jury could determine reliability—face-to-face cross-examination.
66
  
By emphasizing this point, however, Justice Scalia implied that the 
Confrontation Clause imposes a social and moral obligation on some 
hearsay declarants that serves an atavistic purpose of requiring accus-
ers to gather the courage to stand by their previous accusatory asser-
tions as they face the accused. 
This implication can be gleaned from Justice Scalia’s words and 
the tone of his arguments.  For example, to support his argument in 
Crawford, Justice Scalia uses the famous case of Sir Walter Raleigh, 
whose alleged accomplice in treason, Lord Cobham, made incrimi-
nating statements about Raleigh—but not during Raleigh’s trial.
67
  
Justice Scalia quotes Raleigh as saying, “[L]et Cobham be here, let 
him speak it.  Call my accuser before my face.”
68
  In addition, consider the 
following remarks that Justice Scalia made in a pre-Crawford case: 
“[T]here is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-
face confrontation between accused and accuser as ‘essential to a fair 
 
 61 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.   
 62 Crawford, 541 U.S at 61.  
 63 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.   
 64 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.   
 65 See id. at 51–53. 
 66 Id. at 61. 
 67 Id. at 44. 
 68 Id. (emphasis added). 
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trial in a criminal prosecution.’”
69
  Quoting President Dwight D. Ei-
senhower, he added, 
“[M]eet anyone face to face with whom you disagree.  You could 
not sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him, 
without suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry. . . .  In this 
country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up 
in front.  He cannot hide behind the shadow.”
70
 
Furthermore, he stated that “Shakespeare was thus describing 
the root meaning of confrontation when he had Richard the Second 
say: ‘Then call them to our presence—face to face, and frowning brow to 
brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak.’”
71
  
These quotes demonstrate an approach to the Confrontation Clause 
that suggests it is not simply a defendant’s right, but that it also places 
a moral and ethical obligation on those who make accusatory state-
ments.
72
 
D. Davis and the Meaning of “Testimonial” 
The Crawford court left “for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of the term ‘testimonial.’”
73
  That day 
came, partially, in 2006 when the Court decided the combined cases 
of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.
74
  In Davis, the issue 
before the Court was whether certain statements made to a 911 tele-
phone operator in the midst of a domestic-violence dispute were “tes-
timonial.”
75
  By contrast, in Hammon, the issue also involved state-
 
 69 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
404 (1965)).  
 70 Id. at 1017–18 (quoting President Dwight Eisenhower, Remarks Given to the 
B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League (Nov. 23, 1953)) (emphasis added).   
 71 Id. at 1016 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).   
 72 See generally Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation 
Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258 (2003).  Clark argues that the Confrontation Clause 
should be interpreted as a moral and social obligation that is imposed on those who 
act as accusers and not simply as a right belonging to the accused.  Id. at 1258.  He 
explains that “the confrontation right might be best understood in conjunction with 
the oath requirement [and] [t]he oath taken by a witness in a criminal trial may . . . 
serve a way of requiring witnesses to put themselves on the line.”  Id. at 1267. 
 73 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  In a footnote following that statement, the Court 
noted that “this case will cause interim uncertainty.”  Id. at 68 n.10. 
 74 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 75 An abbreviated version of the dialogue between the 911 operator and the vic-
tim, Michelle McCottry: 
911 Operator: What’s going on? 
Complainant: He’s here jumpin’ on me again.  
     . . . . 
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ments made by a domestic-violence victim; however, she made the 
statements after the altercation ended when the police were physical-
ly present at the scene to question the couple, and, moreover, the po-
lice had the victim fill out and sign an affidavit about the altercation.
76
 
The Court used the following rule to make its decisions: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance 
to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later crim-
inal prosecution.
77
 
Accordingly, the Court held that the statements made in Davis to 
the 911 operator were “nontestimonial” because they described 
events that were presently happening and the purpose of the ques-
tion and answer dialogue was to resolve an ongoing emergency.
78
  But 
in Hammon, the Court found that the statements were “testimonial” 
 
911 Operator: Are there any weapons?  
Complainant: No.  He’s usin’ his fists.  
     . . . . 
911 Operator: Okay, sweetie.  I’ve got help started.  Stay on the line 
with me, okay?  
     . . . . 
911 Operator: Listen to me carefully.  Do you know his last name?  
Complainant: It’s Davis. 
Id. at 817–18 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 76 Id. at 819–20.  In Hammon, the police responded to a house where a reported 
domestic disturbance had occurred, and when they arrived on the scene they sepa-
rated the apparent victim, Amy Hammon, from her husband Hershell.  Id. at 819.  
The officers questioned Amy and had her write and sign the following statement: 
“‘Broke our Furnace & shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass.  Hit me 
in the chest and threw me down.  Broke our lamps & phone.  Tore up my van where 
I couldn’t leave the house.  Attacked my daughter.’”  Id. at 819–20 (citation omitted).  
The lower court held that Amy Hammon’s signed affidavit was “testimonial,” but her 
statements to the officers were not and, therefore, were admissible.  Id. at 821. 
 77 Id. at 822.  Justice Thomas made a very thoughtful point in his dissent that is 
relevant to the Buda case: “Assigning one of these two ‘largely unverifiable motives 
[protection and obtaining evidence],’ primacy requires constructing a hierarchy of 
purpose that will rarely be present—and is not reliably discernible.  It will inevitably 
be, quite simply, an exercise in fiction.”  Id. at 839 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
 78 Id. at 827.  While the Supreme Court focuses on the circumstances surround-
ing the “interrogation,” the Court indicates that a “testimonial” statement can be 
made in other contexts as well.  Id. at 822 n.1.   
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because no ongoing emergency existed and the questions were de-
signed to elicit facts about past criminal conduct.
79
 
E. Crawford’s Effect on the Admissibility of Child Hearsay 
The Crawford decision poses obstacles to child-abuse prosecu-
tions that did not exist when courts followed the Roberts rule.
80
  Be-
cause a statement may be “testimonial” even if it is very reliable, the 
same trustworthy or firmly rooted hearsay exceptions that prosecutors 
utilized to overcome constitutional challenges under Roberts are no 
longer useful under Crawford.  For example, in State v. Snowden,
81
 the 
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the admission of two children’s 
extrajudicial statements to a Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices investigator violated the Confrontation Clause because they 
were “testimonial,” notwithstanding the fact that they had been ad-
mitted under the state’s tender-years hearsay exception.
82
  The court 
found that in light of Crawford’s new rule, the fact that the children’s 
statements satisfied the reliability criteria of the state’s tender-years 
exception was irrelevant; because the statements were “testimonial,” 
the Confrontation Clause prohibited their admission into evidence 
without the children testifying.
83
 
After Crawford, a substantial number of courts have held that 
children’s extrajudicial statements to social workers were “testimoni-
al” and, therefore, inadmissible.
84
  Of concern to prosecutors and so-
 
 79 Id. at 829–30.  As will be discussed in more detail infra Part V.B, the term “tes-
timonial” has been a source of great controversy and criticism even after the Davis 
decision.  While a plethora of articles have been written about the meaning of “tes-
timonial,” a well-written collection can be found in Regent University Law Review’s 
2006–2007 Symposium.  Symposium, Confrontation Clause, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 303 
(2006–2007). 
 80 See Mosteller, supra note 23, at 957 (noting that hearsay statements that would 
have been admissible under Roberts may “run contrary to [Crawford’s] restrictions on 
testimonial hearsay”).  Consider also the case of Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 
(2007), where the defendant was convicted in 1993 for child abuse based partially on 
the fact that the victim’s hearsay was admitted into evidence.  After Crawford was 
handed down, the defendant argued that the admission of these statements violated 
the Confrontation Clause because they were “testimonial.”  Id. at 414.  This case 
makes clear that, at least theoretically, children’s hearsay was more easily admitted 
under Roberts than under Crawford.  The Court ruled, however, that Crawford was not 
to be applied retroactively and sustained the defendant’s conviction.  Id. at 409. 
 81 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005). 
 82 Id. at 325.  The children were ten and eight years old, respectively.  Id. at 316. 
 83 See id. at 325. 
 84 See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005); T.P. v. State, 
911 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. 
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cial workers is the fact that courts have been employing inconsistent 
rationales to determine whether a child’s statement is “testimonial.”
85
  
For example, courts have used one or more of the following as the 
determinative factor: whether a reasonable child would anticipate the 
prosecutorial use of the statement,
86
 whether an objective adult would 
anticipate the prosecutorial use of the statement,
87
 and whether the 
questioner’s purpose was to gather past facts that are potentially rele-
vant to a future prosecution.
88
  Others make the determination based 
on the formality of any questioning and the involvement of govern-
ment personnel.
89
  This inconsistency has led to at least one formal 
request for the Supreme Court to provide further guidance on the 
issue of child-victim hearsay and the criteria for determining when a 
 
Ct. App. 2004); People v. Sharp, 155 P.3d 577 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Contre-
ras, 979 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2008); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. 2006); State v. 
Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558; (N.D. 2006); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004); State v. 
Pitt, 147 P.3d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).     
 85 See Brief for the States of Missouri et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
er, Iowa v. Bentley, 128 S. Ct.  1655 (2008) (No. 07-886), 2008 WL 534802 [hereinaf-
ter Missouri Brief] (petitioning the Supreme Court to establish concrete guidelines 
on the issue of the admissibility of child hearsay made to social workers); see also 
Connally, supra note 26, at 4–12; Mosteller, supra note 23, at 944, 976–84 (noting that 
“lower courts are engaged in [an] analysis based upon . . . limited information . . . . 
[and] [w]hen the results are relatively consistent, they might be seen as reasonable 
judicial interpretation in a situation of ambiguity”).  
 86 See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 924–25 (Colo. 2006).  
[A]ssessment of whether or not a reasonable person in the position of 
the declarant would believe a statement would be available for use at a 
later trial involves an analysis of the expectations of a reasonable per-
son in the position of the declarant.  Expectations derive from circums-
tances, and, among other circumstances, a person’s age is a pertinent 
characteristic for analysis. 
Id. at 925. 
 87 See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(“Conceivably, the Supreme Court’s reference to an ‘objective witness’ should be 
taken to mean an objective witness in the same category of persons as the actual wit-
ness—here, an objective four year old.  But we do not think so.  It is more likely that 
the Supreme Court meant simply that if the statement was given under circums-
tances in which its use in a prosecution is reasonably foreseeable by an objective ob-
server, then the statement is testimonial.”). 
 88 See, e.g., State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 564 (N.D. 2006) (holding that the fo-
rensic interviewer’s law-enforcement purpose was dispositive, notwithstanding the 
fact the child was four years old); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004) (holding a 
three-year-old child’s statements were “testimonial” because the Department of Hu-
man Services employee conducting the interview was attempting to elicit statements 
that were to be used in a criminal prosecution). 
 89 See, e.g., People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a 
child’s statement “nontestimonial” because it was made to a private individual as op-
posed to a government employee).    
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statement to a social worker is “testimonial.”
90
  As of the time of pub-
lication, the Supreme Court has not accepted a case involving Craw-
ford’s affect on child hearsay. 
III. STATE V. BUDA
91
 
N.M.’s mother, Christine, was still a teenager when she gave 
birth to N.M. in 1998.
92
  In 2002 Christine began dating the defen-
dant, Ryan Buda.
93
  Soon afterwards, she and N.M. moved out of her 
parents’ home and in with Buda. 
94
 
Christine’s sister regularly babysat N.M. at Christine’s parents’ 
house while Christine was at work.
95
  In July 2002, while Christine was 
driving N.M. to drop him off with her sister, the three-year-old told 
her, “‘Daddy beat me.’”
96
  Christine responded by asking when Buda 
had beat him, and N.M. told her “‘the nighttime.’”
97
  That same day, 
Christine’s mother called her to inform her that N.M. had bruises on 
his buttocks that resembled handprints.
98
  Later that day, Christine 
asked Buda about the bruises, and he claimed that N.M. incurred 
them when he fell down in the bathtub.
99
  Christine accepted this ex-
planation and believed it again two months later when she learned 
that N.M. had bruises on his head.
100
 
On October 16, 2002, Christine’s sister was babysitting N.M. 
while Christine was working.
101
  Usually Christine picked N.M. up, but 
Buda picked N.M. up that day.
102
  When he arrived, N.M. started cry-
ing and refused to leave the house with Buda.
103
  At that point, Chris-
tine’s sister accused Buda of abusing N.M., and an argument en-
 
 90 See Missouri Brief, supra note 85, at *2 (“It is critical for those courts to have 
concrete, uniform guidance . . . as to how to determine the admissibility of a child’s 
out-of-court statement made to child welfare advocates.”) 
 91 State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J 2008). 
 92 Id. at 765. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.; see infra text accompanying note 5.  This statement may be referred to later 
in the Comment as “the July statement.” 
 97 Buda, 949 A.2d at 765. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 765–66. 
 101 Id. at 766. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Buda, 949 A.2d at 766. 
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sued.
104
  The police came to the house,
105
 and “after a phone call to 
Christine,”
106
 the police had to physically carry N.M. into Buda’s car.
107
 
Two days later, on October 18, Christine left N.M. with Buda in-
stead of with her family while she was at work.
108
  When she returned 
from work, N.M. was calmly watching television and Buda was in the 
house nearby.
109
  About an hour after her arrival, Christine noticed a 
large red mark on the back of N.M.’s neck, at which point she be-
came frantic, and she and Buda rushed N.M. to the emergency 
room.
110
  At the hospital, Christine asked Buda what happened to 
N.M., and Buda responded that he did not know and that N.M. 
“‘must have fallen.’”
111
 
N.M. was immediately examined by a doctor in the presence of 
Christine’s parents.
112
  The treating physician at the hospital found 
that N.M. had serious injuries to his scalp, ears, eyes, and neck, as well 
as several other smaller injuries to his scrotum and flank—injuries 
that led the doctor to believe that N.M. had been subjected to physi-
cal abuse.
113
  The doctor reported his findings to DYFS’s Office of 
Child Abuse Control and the Dover Township Police Department.
114
  
The police department then contacted the Ocean County Prosecu-
tor’s Office, and Investigator Kenneth Hess, who is a member of the 
Child Abuse/Sexual Assault Unit, arrived at the hospital around 8:45 
p.m.
115
  Later that evening, Miriam Nurudeen, a member of DYFS’s 
Special Response Unit, arrived at the hospital.
116
  Hess and Nurudeen 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id.  The opinion is unclear about who actually called the police. 
 106 Id.  The opinion is also unclear about who spoke with Christine and what ex-
actly she said.  A reasonable inference is that the police officers spoke with Christine, 
who then told them that Buda had permission to take N.M. from her sister’s house. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Buda, 949 A.2d at 766. 
 110 Id.  Christine’s parents were apparently notified about N.M.’s injuries and 
came to the hospital to be with N.M, but the opinion is unclear about who notified 
them. 
 111 Id. at 766. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 767.  N.M. was ultimately hospitalized for two weeks for internal bleed-
ing.  Id. at 766. 
 114 Id. at 781. 
 115 Buda, 949 A.2d at 781. 
 116 Id. at 767. 
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met to discuss how they should proceed with interviewing N.M.
117
  
Hess decided that Nurudeen should interview N.M. because Hess was 
interviewing Buda.
118
 
Nurudeen entered N.M.’s hospital room and asked his grandpa-
rents to leave the room while she questioned N.M.
119
  The pertinent 
part the interview is as follows: 
Nurudeen: “Okay.  I understand you fell.  How did you fall?” 
N.M.: “From my bed.” 
Nurudeen: “What were you doing?” 
N.M.: [No answer] 
Nurudeen: “Did anybody hit you?  Did anybody beat you?” 
N.M.: “Dad says nobody beat me.  I fell when I was sleeping in my 
room.”
120
 
A. Procedural History 
Buda was eventually charged with three counts of endangering 
the welfare of a child and one count of assault.
121
  Although apparent-
ly available, N.M. did not testify at trial,
122
 but Christine, the treating 
physician, and Nurudeen testified for the prosecution.
123
  After a pre-
trial hearing regarding the admissibility of N.M.’s hearsay state-
ments,
124
 the trial court concluded that both the July statement, in 
which N.M. told his mother that “Daddy beat me” and the October 
statements made to Nurudeen fell under New Jersey’s “excited utter-
ance” hearsay exception and were therefore admissible into evi-
dence.
125
  The trial court also concluded that Crawford would not pre-
 
 117 Id. at 781. 
 118 Id.  Nurudeen indicated that prosecutors normally interview the child first and 
sometimes the DYFS investigator and the prosecutor interview the child together.  Id. 
 119 Id. at 781–82. 
 120 Id. at 782.  These statements may be collectively referred to as “the October 
statements” in the remainder of this Comment. 
 121 Buda, 949 A.2d at 767.  Christine was also charged with one count of second-
degree endangering the welfare of a child, which the state later reduced to one 
count of fourth-degree cruelty and neglect of a child, in exchange for her coopera-
tion and testimony against Buda.  Id. at 767 n.3. 
 122 Id. at 767, 783. 
 123 Id. at 767. 
 124 N.J.R.E. 104. 
 125 Buda, 949 A.2d at 768; see also N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2) (stating that an excited utter-
ance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the decla-
rant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition and without 
opportunity to deliberate or fabricate”).  The admission of excited utterances is not 
conditioned on the availability of the declarant, which explains why the prosecutor 
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vent N.M.’s statements from being admitted into evidence.
126
  Buda 
was eventually convicted of all charges.
127
 
Buda challenged his conviction on several grounds, most notably 
that the admission of both the July and the October statements vi-
olated the Confrontation Clause.
128
  On appeal, the appellate division 
held that while both sets of statements were excited utterances and 
thus passed the evidentiary bar against hearsay statements, N.M.’s 
statements to Nurudeen were “testimonial” and constitutionally in-
admissible.
129
  The appellate division rejected Buda’s claim that the 
July statement to Christine was “testimonial” and, accordingly, held 
that the statement that “Daddy beat me” was properly admitted into 
evidence.
130
  After the appellate division reversed and remanded the 
case, both Buda and the State petitioned the New Jersey Supreme 
Court for certification, which was granted.
131
 
B. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
The State argued that the appellate division erred in concluding 
that the October statements were “testimonial” because (1) neither 
N.M. nor anyone similarly situated would have expected the state-
ments to have been used in a criminal prosecution, and (2) Nuru-
deen’s primary purpose in questioning N.M. was to protect him, not 
to elicit evidence of past facts.
132
  Buda argued that the appellate divi-
 
did not have to demonstrate that N.M. was unavailable to testify as a prerequisite to 
admitting N.M.’s hearsay.  See id.  See also infra note 130 for a discussion regarding 
the decision to label N.M.’s statements as an excited utterances.  Notably, N.M.’s 
statement would not qualify for New Jersey’s tender-years hearsay exception because 
that exception requires the child to be a victim of sexual abuse, and no such allega-
tion was made in this case.  See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). 
 126 Buda, 949 A.2d at 776–77.  The Davis case had not even been argued before 
the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of Buda’s trial.  Id. at 777 n.6.   
 127 Id. at 768. 
 128 Id. at 768.  Buda also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
guilty verdict, that certain jury instructions were in error, and that his sentence was 
improper.  Id.   
 129 State v. Buda, 912 A.2d. 735, 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (“The Octo-
ber statement . . . was taken when N.M. was no longer in danger and there was no 
‘ongoing emergency.’  As a result the statement must be deemed testimonial . . . .” 
(citation omitted)), rev’d, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).  
 130 Id. at 746 n.11. 
 131 Buda, 949 A.2d at 769. 
 132 Id. 
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sion erred when it decided that N.M.’s July statements to Christine 
were admissible as excited utterances and were not “testimonial.”
133
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, be-
gan its legal analysis by stating that “we address first whether N.M.’s 
hearsay statements to his mother or the DYFS worker qualify as ex-
cited utterances . . . .  We then turn to whether those statements are 
‘testimonial’ within the meaning of Crawford and Davis.”
134
  After the 
Buda majority held that the trial court had not abused its discretion 
in concluding that both statements met the evidentiary requirements 
of New Jersey’s excited-utterance hearsay exception,
135
 the court ad-
dressed each statement to determine if its admission had violated the 
Confrontation Clause.
136
  The court, relying on the Crawford decision, 
reasoned that N.M.’s statement to Christine that “Daddy beat me” was 
not “testimonial” because it was more analogous to a “‘casual remark 
to an acquaintance,’ than to a statement in response to a ‘formal 
statement [given] to government officers.’”
137
 
 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 770. 
 135 Id. at 773.  While this Comment deals specifically with the analysis of N.M.’s 
statement to Nurudeen and whether its admission at trial violated the Confrontation 
Clause, the majority surprisingly held that N.M.’s statements to Christine and Nuru-
deen were excited utterances.  Id.  The elements of an excited utterance in New Jer-
sey are (1) a statement relating to a startling event or condition; (2) made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition; (3) 
without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate.  See State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673, 689 
(N.J. 2003) (citing N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2)).  The three Buda dissenters vigorously argued 
that neither N.M.’s statements to Christine nor his statements to Nurudeen met the 
elements of an excited utterance.  Buda, 949 A.2d at 781, 787 (Albin, J., dissenting).  
The dissent pointed out that to be considered an excited utterance, the elicited 
statement must be related to the startling event at issue—in this case, alleged physical 
abuse.  Id. at 782 n.2.  Thus, the dissent explains that  
for [N.M.’s] responses to [Nurudeen] to be “excited utterances,” 
[N.M.] must have been under the continuing stress and excitement 
caused by the beating, not caused by the mother’s discovery of the 
child’s injury, which the majority describes as the “intervening action-
filled chaos.”  The “intervening action filled chaos” is not a substitute 
for the startling event. 
Id. (citation omitted).  The dissent also argued that the July statement did not meet 
the elements of an excited utterance because there was no concrete evidence of 
when N.M. had last been abused, and thus, it seems as if he had time to deliberate 
and that he was not under the stress of a “startling event.”  Id. at 787–88. 
 136 Id. at 773 (majority opinion).  This section addresses only the majority’s opi-
nion.  See infra Part IV for certain arguments the dissent makes about the majority 
opinion. 
 137 Id. at 777–78 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 53–54 (2004)).  
The Crawford Court made clear that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to 
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The court then addressed the most controversial issue of the 
case—the statements N.M. made to Nurudeen in the hospital, which 
the majority held were not “testimonial.”
138
  The Buda majority used 
the Davis decision
139
 to guide its resolution of the issue and attempted 
to assign Nurudeen one of two possible purposes while she was ques-
tioning N.M.: (1) resolving a life-threatening emergency or (2) ga-
thering past facts relevant to a potential criminal prosecution.
140
  The 
majority believed that Nurudeen’s purpose fell neatly into the for-
mer.
141
  In the court’s words, Nurudeen’s primary purpose was “to 
end defendant’s then-present reign of terror over N.M., [who made] 
a statement no different than the domestic abuse victim’s 911 call 
Davis instructs is nontestimonial.”
142
 
Not only did the Buda majority believe that Nurudeen’s primary 
purpose was to protect N.M., but it also argued that Nurudeen had 
absolutely no prosecutorial purpose and that a clear separation of du-
ties existed between her and the county prosecutor, Investigator 
Hess.  The court stated, 
 Here the DYFS worker was doing precisely her job: she was not 
collecting information about past events for prosecutorial pur-
poses, but gathering data in order to assure a child’s future well-
being.  Indeed, by the time she arrived at the hospital, an investi-
gator from the Prosecutor’s Office already was there.  The divi-
sion of duties [at the hospital] was clear: while the Prosecutor’s 
Office investigator was charged with collecting evidence of the 
crimes visited on N.M., the DYFS worker was responsible for en-
suring N.M.’s continued safety and well-being.
143
 
Thus, the majority determined that Nurudeen’s role at the hospital 
was to resolve a “life-threatening emergency” and was not to aid in 
the investigation of Buda’s prosecution.
144
  Based on this rationale, 
 
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual re-
mark to an acquaintance does not.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  Thus, it would be diffi-
cult to argue that N.M.’s statement to Christine could be “testimonial.”  In fact, al-
most no post-Crawford cases have found that statements made to family or friends are 
“testimonial.”  See Mosteller, supra note 23, at 947–48.   
 138 Buda, 949 A.2d at 778. 
 139 See supra Part II.D. 
 140 Buda, 949 A.2d at 778–79. 
 141 Id. at 778. 
 142 Id. at 780.  
 143 Id.  
 144 Id. at 778; see infra note 171 (discussing the majority’s decision to use the term 
“life-threatening emergency”). 
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the court concluded that N.M.’s statements were “nontestimonial” 
and reinstated Buda’s conviction.
145
 
IV. THE BUDA MAJORITY’S FLAWED APPROACH AND REASONING 
While the majority was ultimately correct in concluding that 
N.M.’s statements were not “testimonial,”
146
 the three dissenting jus-
tices properly criticized the majority’s reasoning.  The majority stated 
that Nurudeen was gathering facts for a purely civil purpose—
protecting N.M. from a “life-threatening emergency”—and not for 
any prosecutorial purpose.
147
  This conclusion is problematic because 
it attempts to make a parallel comparison between Buda and Davis 
but is only able to do so by distorting the meaning of an “ongoing 
emergency” and by denying the crucial role that DYFS workers play in 
investigating and prosecuting child abusers. 
A. The Buda Majority’s Reliance on Davis Was Misplaced 
The first major problem with the Buda majority opinion is that it 
relies too heavily on the factually distinct Davis case.  While Davis did 
provide some criteria for explaining the meaning of “testimonial,” 
the decision also left much unresolved.  It seems as though the rule 
laid down in Davis was tailored specifically to fit facts before the 
Court, as opposed to a general “one size fits all” rule that was prede-
termined and subsequently applied to the facts of the cases before 
the Court.  As the dissenting justices in Buda point out, “the test set 
forth in Davis ‘suffice[d] to decide’ [Hammon and Davis.]  The [Unit-
ed States Supreme] Court was prescient to foresee that a multitude of 
variations on the theme would arise and did not expect a court, such 
as [the New Jersey Supreme Court], to apply its words mechanistical-
ly . . . .”
148
 
 
 145 Buda, 949 A.2d at 780. 
 146 See infra Part V.C for a more detailed explanation of why N.M.’s statement was 
not “testimonial.”  
 147 Buda, 949 A.2d at 778. 
 148 Id. at 786.  Significantly, Judge Sabatino of the appellate division seemed to be 
begging for another way to decide the case when he wrote, “[I]f one is compelled to 
identify a single dominant purpose of Nurudeen’s hospital interview of N.M. here, I 
am inclined to agree with my colleagues that the interview was mainly to assist law 
enforcement . . . .  Forced to choose, I concur with the majority’s assessment that the 
child’s statement to Nurudeen was ‘testimonial’ . . . .”  State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 
749 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (Sabatino, J., concurring) (emphasis added), 
rev’d, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).  One of this Comment’s main points is that a court 
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With that critique in mind, it is helpful to think of Davis and 
Hammon as setting forth two polar ends on a continuum of possible 
Confrontation Clause scenarios, with one end representing clearly 
“testimonial” statements (Hammon) and the other end representing 
statements that are “nontestimonial” (Davis).  The holdings in those 
cases were relatively uncontroversial and unsurprising
149
 because in 
both cases the declarants were competent adults, the statements were 
responses to questions from law-enforcement personnel, the primary 
purpose of the questions could be (arguably) fairly easily identified,
150
 
and the line at which each respective emergency ended was fairly 
straightforward.  But Davis does not give any detailed directive on 
how to decide cases that fall in the middle of the continuum, such as 
the Buda case, where the declarant is a young child, the questioner is 
not a law-enforcement employee, and the interview has an unverifia-
ble or dual purpose.
151
 
As opposed to interpreting Davis as establishing the polar ends 
of a continuum, the Buda majority seems to have interpreted Davis as 
setting forth two discrete possibilities, forcing them to pigeonhole 
Nurudeen into either the role of a 911 operator responding to a 
crime in progress or into that of a police officer asking questions 
about a crime committed in the past to gather evidence.  The Buda 
case, however, did not fall into either one of those scenarios.  There-
fore, any attempt at a literal application of Davis could not sufficiently 
 
should not be “forced” or “compelled” to apply a doctrine to a set of facts to which it 
does not apply and that will not sufficiently resolve the legal issue at hand. 
 149 In fact, one commentator argued that the rule laid down in Davis can be ex-
plained by the common law res gestae doctrine, the predecessor of the modern ex-
cited-utterance exception.  See Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—and What is Happen-
ing—to the Confrontation Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 608–16 (2007).  Professor Fisher 
compares the modern day 911 call to the “hue and cry” of crime victims during the 
framing era—calls that had the purpose of both alerting the village constable to the 
commission of a crime and aiding in the perpetrator’s criminal prosecution.  Id. at 
592.  Noting the lack of reliable records from criminal trials in the framing era, Fish-
er examined criminal cases in the post-framing era and found that courts would ad-
mit victims’ statements that were made contemporaneously with the criminal act but 
not those that described past events.  Id. at 598–99.  According to Fisher’s study, res 
gestae statements were exempt from the common-law right of confrontation and 
this, he argues, fully explains the Court’s rationale in Davis.  Id. at 603, 608. 
 150 But see supra note 77. 
 151 See State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 748 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (Sabatino, 
J., concurring) (noting that Davis  does not “contemplate the sticky circumstance in 
which the ‘primary purpose’ of a declarant’s interview is unclear, or where the inter-
view is being conducted for dual or multiple purposes”), rev’d, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 
2008). 
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resolve the legal issue before the court.  The Buda court appears to 
have overemphasized the utility of the Davis opinion and applied it in 
a mechanistic manner that was unintended by the Supreme Court.
152
 
B. Denying the Investigatory Purpose of DYFS Investigators 
Despite the assertions of the Buda majority, DYFS investigators 
regularly play a substantial role in the criminal prosecution of ac-
cused child abusers,
153
 and the facts of the case demonstrate that Nu-
rudeen had a substantial prosecutorial purpose when she questioned 
N.M.  DYFS has the legal responsibility of investigating allegations of 
child abuse
154
 and then, based on a set of prescribed factors, making 
 
 152 Although the author disagrees that the Davis opinion was a directive to lower 
courts to look only at the alleged purpose of a questioner, some courts believe that 
that was exactly what the Court was implying.  See, e.g., State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 
916, 924 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).  (“It has become evident under Crawford and Davis 
that the Supreme Court has deliberately abandoned a prior, vague Confrontation 
Clause test in favor of a new approach that focuses on an uncomplicated study of the 
purpose of an interviewer who takes a statement that is later introduced as trial evi-
dence.”).  This position is questionable because the Supreme Court has indicated 
that “testimonial” statements can be made even when no questioner is involved.  See 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.1.  It is perplexing to consider how courts using an “uncom-
plicated study of the purpose of the interviewer” would address situations such as 
taped crime tips, accusatory written documents, and any other situation in which in-
formation is given without an interviewer.  
 153 The majority recognized this fact when it stated, 
     This is not to say that a DYFS worker in all instances will be acting in 
a purely civil capacity.  One can envision circumstances where the 
DYFS worker serves predominantly as an agent/proxy or an operative 
for law enforcement in the collection of evidence of past crimes . . . 
that may well render the hearsay statements thereby procured testi-
monial under Crawford.  However, other than acknowledging that pos-
sibility, we need not discuss it further in this case in light of the facts 
presented. 
State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 779–80 (N.J. 2008) (citation omitted).  In light of the 
court’s holding, however, it is hard to conceive of a set of facts that would lend to a 
finding of a “testimonial” statement made to a DYFS worker.  
 154 See Public Hearing Before Senate Committee on Children’s Services Committee: To Ex-
amine Policy Issues Relating to Investigations by the Division of Youth and Family Services of 
Reports of Child Abuse, 1988 Leg., 203rd Sess. 26, 45–46 (N.J. 1988) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearing] (statement of William Waldman, Director, DYFS).  During that initial inves-
tigation, DYFS workers are required to  
interview the alleged child victim . . . [,]  
     . . . .  
[i]nterview . . . the caregiver and each adult in the home . . . [,] 
     . . . . 
[i]nterview . . . each other person identified . . . as having knowledge of 
the incident or as having made an assessment of physical harm . . . [, 
and] 
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the decision about whether to report the case to the county prosecu-
tor.
155
  If a case is referred to the prosecutor, the DYFS investigator 
must include a written report, the contents of which have informa-
tion that can be used as evidence against the abuser in a criminal tri-
al.
156
 
After referring a case to a prosecutor, DYFS conducts “fact-
finding” investigations, which involve in-depth interviews with victims, 
alleged perpetrators, and others to determine “what happened,”
157
 not 
simply what is happening.  This investigation may be going on simulta-
neously with the prosecutor’s investigation, and the two investigations 
“may merge” into one.
158
  Thus, as the Buda dissent points out, the 
 
[i]nterview . . . the alleged perpetrator 
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:129-2.5 (2009).  Further, “the child protective investigator 
shall determine if a joint investigation is possible and consult with the investigating 
police officer or prosecutor before interviewing the alleged child victim, unless 
emergency action is needed.”  Id. 
 155 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:129-3.1.  
 156 Id. § 10:129-5.5(e) (“The written information regarding the report shall in-
clude: 1. The name and age of each child victim and his or her address; 2. The name 
and age of each of the child victim’s siblings, if any, obtained by the child protective 
investigator during his or her investigation; 3. The name of each perpetrator, his or 
her address, and his or her relationship to each child victim . . . .”). 
 157 Senate Hearing, supra note 154, at 26 (statement of William Waldman, Director, 
DYFS) (emphasis added). 
 158 See Senate Hearing, supra note 154, at 56 (Statement of Joyce Munkacsi, Assistant 
Prosecutor, Middlesex County and Co-chair, Governor’s Task Force on Child Abuse 
and Neglect).  Not only might these investigations “merge,” but DYFS’s regulatory 
scheme apparently encourages their investigators to work directly with the police and 
prosecutors.  See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:129-1.1(b) (2009).  The purpose of this regu-
lation is to 
Define each circumstance requiring [DYFS’s] referral of a report to a 
medical or other professional, law enforcement officer or prosecutor 
for specialized assessment;  
. . . [s]et forth guidelines by which Division caseworkers may easily 
identify cases that must be referred to prosecutors;  
. . . [e]stablish procedures for such referrals to prosecutors;  
. . . [e]stablish a system through which a Department caseworker may 
assist prosecutors in determining which cases should be investigated 
for criminal prosecution and in identifying cases in which criminal in-
vestigation or prosecution would be detrimental to the child’s best in-
terests;  
. . . [e]stablish a framework for liaison and improved communication 
and cooperation between the Department’s local offices and the pros-
ecutors’ offices in order to further the mutual goals of protecting the 
child and proper law enforcement; [and] 
. . . identify the requirements for accessing law enforcement assis-
tance[.] 
Id. 
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“protection of the child and prosecution of the offender [are] inex-
tricably intertwined.”
159
 
The merging of the investigations occurs because the same facts 
are relevant to both family-law proceedings involving child abuse and 
the criminal prosecution of a defendant for that abuse, with the only 
major evidentiary distinction being the standard of proof required 
for judicial action.
160
  Thus, facts found by police officers may fre-
quently be used in civil proceedings because parental abuse is 
grounds for termination of custody
161
 and because the fact-finding in-
vestigations led by DYFS are the basis for deciding whether to prose-
cute an alleged abuser.
162
 
The foregoing should be well known by the New Jersey judiciary.  
For example, in State v. Helewa
163
 the appellate division held that the 
Miranda
164
 doctrine applied to a DYFS worker who had conducted a 
custodial interview of a criminal defendant accused of child abuse.  
There, the court held that the DYFS worker was acting as an agent of 
law enforcement.
165
  The court reasoned that 
there is significant cooperation with DYFS during the investigato-
ry stages of child abuse cases, specifically with respect to the ex-
change of reports and other sources of information. . . .  Al-
though the DYFS caseworker’s ultimate purpose in obtaining 
information from the alleged perpetrator is to ensure the protec-
tion and welfare of the child, the likelihood of such information 
being used against the perpetrator in a criminal prosecution 
changes the status of the “social worker” to one of a “law en-
forcement officer” . . . .
166
 
 
 159 State v. Buda, 949 A.2d at 761, 786 (N.J. 2008) (Albin, J., dissenting). 
 160 See Senate Hearing, supra note 154, at 40 (statement of William Waldman, Direc-
tor, DYFS) (“There are individuals that may have been found not guilty in criminal 
court proceeding, but where abuses and/or neglect may have been substantiated by 
both [DYFS] and the family court of New Jersey.”). 
 161 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN § 30:4C-15(a) (West 2008) (establishing that a convic-
tion for child abuse permits the filing of a petition for termination of parental 
rights). 
 162 See Senate Hearing, supra note 154, at 40–41 (statement of William Waldman, 
Director, DYFS). 
 163 537 A.2d 1328 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). 
 164 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 165 Helewa, 537 A.2d at 1333.  
 166 Id. at 1332. 
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It bears repeating that on the night that Nurudeen interviewed N.M., 
Hess and the police were already at the hospital when she arrived.
167
  
Nurudeen and Hess met before she interviewed N.M. and discussed 
how the two of them should proceed in interviewing N.M.
168
  Because 
Hess was interviewing Buda, he asked Nurudeen to speak with N.M.
169
  
To borrow terminology from criminal law, it seems evident that Nu-
rudeen’s state of mind when she questioned N.M. was that she kno-
wingly, if not intentionally, questioned N.M. to give information to 
Hess that would aid in a criminal prosecution.  With this in mind, the 
Buda majority apparently indulged in a legal fiction when it asserted 
that Nurudeen was investigating in a purely civil capacity. 
C. The Court Distorted the Meaning of an Ongoing Emergency 
In addition to denying that Nurudeen had a prosecutorial pur-
pose, the court used flawed reasoning when it asserted that N.M. was 
facing a “life-threatening emergency” analogous to the situation in 
Davis.
170
  The Buda court’s choice of words makes clear that it was ana-
logizing N.M.’s situation to what the Supreme Court called an “ongo-
ing emergency” in Davis, which the Court explained is an indicator of 
a “nontestimonial” statement.
171
  This analogy, however, is misplaced 
because Davis makes perfectly clear that “ongoing emergenc[ies]” are 
short lived and are contingent on the threat of imminent danger.
172
 
Using the Buda majority’s reasoning, N.M.’s life had been one 
continuous “ongoing emergency” from the time that he and Chris-
 
 167 State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 766 (N.J. 2008). 
 168 Id. at 781 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 778 (majority opinion). 
 171 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  While the Buda majority 
used the term “life-threatening emergency” as opposed to “ongoing emergency,” it is 
readily apparent that the two terms were meant to be synonymous for all practical 
purposes.  The Buda dissent only refers to “ongoing emergencies,” Buda, 949 A.2d at 
784–85 (Albin, J., dissenting), and part of the reason why the appellate division held 
that N.M.’s statements were “testimonial” was that N.M. was no longer facing an on-
going emergency in need of immediate resolution.  State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 745 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).  In fact, nowhere in 
Crawford or Davis does the Court even mention a “life-threatening” emergency—a 
fact that casts some doubt on the Buda majority’s choice of words and the import 
given to them.  For purposes of argument in this Comment, however, “life-
threatening” and “ongoing” will be treated synonymously. 
 172 Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (emphasis added).  The Court noted that Davis’s 911 call 
could easily turn into a “testimonial” statement once the emergency clearly ended.  
Id. 
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tine moved in with Buda—an idea that is antithetical to the explana-
tion given in Davis.  The majority’s reasoning cannot withstand scru-
tiny because any imminent threat of physical harm had ended hours 
before Nurudeen began questioning N.M.  During the questioning, 
N.M. was in a hospital, protected by his grandparents, a prosecutor, 
and police officers; he was physically separated from his mother and 
Buda; and the last incident of abuse had occurred at least several 
hours before Nurudeen arrived.
173
  Despite the majority’s reliance on 
Davis, N.M.’s situation was not comparable to the ongoing emergency 
present in that case—a woman who was being or had just been physi-
cally assaulted.
174
 
Davis also explains that “ongoing emergencies” can be identified 
by the time reference of the dialogue.
175
  Specifically, questions aimed 
at resolving ongoing emergencies will elicit answers about events “as 
they [are] happening,”
176
 not “‘describing past events.’”
177
  Nurudeen’s 
questions, “‘Did anybody hit you?’” and “‘Did anybody beat you?’”
178
 
were clearly aimed at discovering facts about past events.  While it is 
indisputable that returning N.M. to Buda and Christine could have 
been detrimental to his mental and physical health, believing that 
N.M. was facing an ongoing emergency in the hospital that night is 
more than a stretch.  A deplorable situation—even one that can be 
described as life threatening—is not the equivalent of an ongoing 
emergency if the immediacy of the physical harm is absent. 
V. THE MISSING LINK: N.M.’S COMPETENCY TO MAKE  
A TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT 
While the reasoning behind the majority’s decision is problemat-
ic, its conclusion that N.M.’s statements to Nurudeen were not “tes-
timonial” is ultimately correct—but for reasons other than those giv-
en.  Under Crawford, extrajudicial declarants who make “testimonial” 
statements are analogues to in-court witnesses, at least for Confronta-
tion Clause purposes.
179
  Just as some children are not competent to 
 
 173 Buda, 949 A.2d at 785 (Albin, J., dissenting).  The Buda dissenters actually con-
sidered N.M.’s situation to be much more analogous to the facts of the Hammon case 
as opposed to those of Davis.  Id.   
 174 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.   
 175 Id. at 827. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. (citation omitted). 
 178 Buda, 949 A.2d at 782 (Albin, J., dissenting).   
 179 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).  
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be witnesses at trial, some children likewise may not be competent to 
act as witnesses in an extrajudicial setting, rendering them incapable 
of making “testimonial” statements.
180
  In the Buda case, N.M. likely 
did not possess this “testimonial” competence, and therefore, con-
frontation was not constitutionally required—not because Nurudeen 
was acting in a purely civil capacity in an attempt to end an ongoing 
emergency but, rather, because N.M. was not competent to act as a 
“witness” against Buda.  Although the Supreme Court of the United 
States has yet to explicitly recognize or define what “testimonial” 
competence is and how it can be determined, clues about “testimoni-
al” competence can be taken from the requirements of formal trial 
competency, from the Court’s description of “testimonial” statements 
in Crawford and Davis, and also from the Court’s Fifth Amendment 
self-incrimination jurisprudence. 
A. Trial Witnesses 
The Davis Court explained that “testimonial” statements are 
“substitute[s] for live testimony because they do precisely what a wit-
ness does on direct examination.”181  Given the parallel between in-
court and extrajudicial witnesses, it is relevant for this Comment’s 
purposes to consider the competency requirements of potential trial 
witnesses. 
In the American legal system, a witness must be competent to 
testify.
182
  A competent witness is one who has personal knowledge 
about the issue for which he will testify and  can and will take an oath 
or affirmation that his testimony will be truthful.
183
  While an oath or 
affirmation is explicitly a witness’s promise to tell the truth, implicit 
in the taking of the oath is the witness’s assurance to the court that he 
understands his moral duty to be honest and that lying has adverse 
consequences.
184
  The oath was originally intended to impress on the 
 
 180 See supra note 26.  
 181 Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
 182 See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 160 (2004). 
 183 See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6002 (2d ed. 2007); see also FED. R. EVID. 603; N.J.R.E. 603.  Although the 
Federal Rules of Evidence do not define oath or affirmation, the general difference 
between the two is that an oath is a solemn promise to God to speak the truth, while 
an affirmation is a promise to tell the truth without any religious invocation.  See 27 
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra § 6044. 
 184 See FED. R. EVID. 603 (stating that the oath is “calculated to awaken the witness’ 
conscience and impress the witness’ mind with the duty” to tell the truth); see also 
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witness fear of divine punishment for lying.
185
  Although belief in di-
vine retribution is no longer a prerequisite for testifying,
186
 witnesses 
who intentionally lie—perjurers—may still be subject to criminal pu-
nishment.
187
  These burdens are placed on the witness, at least in part 
due to the serious consequences that the accused in a criminal trial 
could face as a result of the witness’s testimony.
188
 
Courts have long struggled with the issue of child-witness compe-
tency.
189
  At early common law, very young children, usually those 
younger than seven, were presumed incompetent because they were 
believed to be unable to fully understand and appreciate the oath.
190
  
The writings of the seventeenth century English jurist, Sir Matthew 
Hale, however, indicate that many courts took the position that in-
competent children’s hearsay should be admitted in cases of sexual 
abuse because it was the best evidence available and also that incom-
petent children ought to be able to speak to the jury unsworn.
191
  In 
the late 1700s, the presumption of incompetence was effectively elim-
inated after King v. Brasier,
192
 a case in which the Twelve Judges held 
 
State v. Zamorsky, 387 A.2d 1227, 1230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).  The Za-
morsky court stated, 
Since the goal is to ascertain the child’s comprehension of the duty of 
a witness to tell the truth, it is first necessary to explore the child’s con-
ceptual awareness of truth and falsehood.  The younger the child, the 
more searching the inquiry must be.  When it has been established that 
the child understands the meaning of those terms, the next area of in-
quiry is not, as is so often the case, whether the child will tell the truth, 
but rather whether the child understands that it is his or her duty to tell the 
truth.  This is the essence of moral responsibility.  
Id. at 1230 (emphasis added). 
 185 See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 183, § 6044. 
 186 See In re R.R., 398 A.2d 76, 82 (N.J. 1979). 
 187 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:28-1 (West 2005). 
 188 See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 525–26 (1895) (“[C]are must 
be taken by the trial judge [in assessing competency], especially where, as in this 
case, the question is one of life or death.”).  A noteworthy law in New York allows in-
competent children to make unsworn statements to the jury but does not permit the 
defendant to be convicted based solely on these unsworn statements.  N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 60.20 (Consol. 1996).  
 189 See The Competency of Child Witnesses, 39 VA. L. REV. 358, 358 (1953).  
 190 See John E. B. Meyers, The Testimonial Competence of Children, 25 J. FAM. L. 287, 
293 n.29 (1986–1987) (citing 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 188 
(3d ed. 1944)). 
 191 See Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of Children’s Hearsay: 
From Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029, 1034–35 (2007). 
 192 R v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.), reprinted in Lyon & Lamagna, su-
pra note 191, at 1032–33. 
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that courts should no longer presume incompetence based solely 
upon a child’s age.
193
  Thus, after Brasier, unless a court found a spe-
cific child to be incompetent after examination, the child would be 
required to testify under oath.
194
 
The Federal Rules of Evidence and New Jersey Rules of Evidence 
take the view that all witnesses, regardless of age, are presumed to be 
formally competent.
195
  If a party raises a substantial question about 
the child’s competence, however, the court may conduct an examina-
tion and make a discretionary ruling.
196
  When a court determines 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 See Lyon & Lamagna, supra note 191, at 1052.  The Twelve Judges were a group 
of judges from the three common law courts who would hear significant legal issues 
and whose decisions set binding precedent.  Id. at 1032 n.10 (citing JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 212–13 (2003)).  Brasier 
appears to have been cited by the Davis court to support the notion that “ongoing 
emergencies” are short lived.  Id. at 1030.  In Brasier, a young girl complained to her 
mother that she had just been raped.  Id. at 1032–33 (citing R v. Brasier, (1779) 168 
Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.)).  The trial court presumed the child to be incompetent and 
allowed her mother to testify about the child’s complaint.  Id.  The Twelve Judges 
ruled that the trial court had erred in presuming the child to be incompetent and 
that henceforth courts should use discretion when faced with a question of an indi-
vidual child’s competency to take the oath.  Id. at 1032–33.  Thus, Brasier eliminated 
the presumption of incompetence, but it also stands for the proposition that child-
ren’s hearsay should still be admitted if it is the best evidence available—that is, when 
the child is incapable of testifying under oath.  Id. at 1053.  Notably, one suggestion 
is that Brasier should be interpreted as a prohibition on children’s hearsay, which 
comes from WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (Richard Burn ed., 9th ed. 1783).  
Lyon & Lamagna, supra note 191, at 1053.  But Burn only briefly mentions Brasier, 
and his sources are unknown.  Id.  Furthermore, many case reports and treatises after 
Brasier indicate that incompetent children’s hearsay was still regularly admitted, 
which shows that Brasier did not affect this practice.  Id. at 1052–53. 
 195 FED. R. EVID. 601; N.J.R.E. 601.  Jurisdictions, like New Jersey, that follow the 
approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence do not need to take any special precau-
tions for child witnesses.  See LUCY S. MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 106 (1994).  Children as young as three have been 
deemed competent to give testimony at trial.  See State v. R.W., 514 A.2d 1287 (N.J. 
1986).  In addition, a national trend has been to lower formal competency standards 
and, in some cases, eliminate competency inquiries altogether.  See MCGOUGH, supra, 
at 14, 106–07.  While the author agrees that age is not a determinative factor of com-
petence, courts should be wary of allowing very young children to testify because 
formal competence serves the purpose of promoting honest and reliable testimony.  
The diminution of competency standards runs the risk of reducing the competence 
requirement to a meaningless formalism that not only is prejudicial to the defendant 
but also is not the best route to ensuring that children’s accounts of abuse are admit-
ted into evidence. 
 196 See, e.g., Galindo v. United States, 630 A.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting 
the need to conduct competency tests on very young children); see also Walters v. 
McCormick, 108 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 1997) (“After a defendant raises a colora-
ble objection to the competency of a witness, the trial judge must perform a ‘reason-
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that a child is competent to testify, the court is not guaranteeing that 
the child will be truthful but, rather, is deciding that the child at least 
has the ability to appreciate the oath and the responsibilities it en-
tails.
197
  Without this understanding, the child may be deemed in-
competent to testify and disqualified as a witness.
198
 
Thus, one aspect of “testimonial” competence can be extracted 
from formal competency standards: the competency requirements of 
trial witnesses lead to the logical assumption that a child who would 
be incompetent to testify at trial could not possibly make a “testi-
monial” statement before trial.
199
  A finding that a child-victim is in-
competent to testify at trial would be difficult to reconcile with a rul-
ing that the child was competent to be a witness against the accused 
at the time that he made the statement before trial.  Therefore, un-
der Crawford, the formally incompetent child could not have made a 
“testimonial” statement, and confrontation is not required by the 
Constitution.  To assert otherwise would be the equivalent of a court 
saying, “It is not possible for this child to be a witness at trial because 
he is not competent to testify.  He is too young to comprehend the 
difference between truth and falsehood nor does he understand the 
moral duties and obligations required of a witness.  But because the 
child was acting as a witness and giving the equivalent of testimony 
 
able exploration of all the facts and circumstances’ concerning competency.” (quot-
ing Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1523 (11th Cir. 1987))).  Because FED. R. 
EVID. 601 does not explicitly state that federal courts have authority to disqualify a 
witness based on competency, the federal courts of appeals have taken two primary 
approaches to the issue.  See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND 
CASES 169 (2006).  Some courts, like the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
have held that the authority to disqualify a witness does not come from FED. R. EVID. 
601 but rather from rules covering the prejudicial effect of the proffered testimony 
(FED. R. EVID. 403), the ability of the potential witness to comprehend the oath (FED. 
R. EVID.  603), and whether the witness can satisfy the personal-knowledge require-
ment (FED. R. EVID. 602).  See ALLEN ET AL, supra, at 169 (citing United States v. Rami-
rez, 871 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1989)).  Others, like the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, have taken the approach that courts retain the discretionary power 
they had at common law, which is presently derived from Rule 601.  See id. at 170 (cit-
ing United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 291–92 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 197 N.J.R.E. 601 advisory committee’s note. 
 198 See, e.g., State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1987) (where the trial court ruled that 
the three-year-old did not understand the duty to tell the truth, thus making her in-
competent to testify).  
 199 At least one court has considered this argument.  See State v. Krasky, 736 
N.W.2d 636, 642 n.6 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “it would be an odd outcome if we 
were to hold that, while [the child] is not competent to be called to the stand to give 
testimony in court, her out-of-court statements . . . are nonetheless inadmissible be-
cause they are testimonial in nature”). 
DARCY (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2010  6:14 PM 
2010] COMMENT 1203 
 
before trial, his statements cannot be admitted unless he confronts 
the defendant and gives live testimony in court.”  Based on the logical 
absurdity of that scenario, it seems fair to infer that, at a minimum, a 
child who is incompetent to testify at trial was not “testimonially” 
competent before trial. 
B. What a “Testimonial” Statement Requires of the Declarant
200
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly defined the term 
“testimonial” nor has it set firm guidelines for identifying a “testi-
monial” statement in all situations.
201
  The Crawford and Davis opi-
nions, however, suggest several questions and criteria that courts 
should consider when determining the “testimonial” nature of a 
statement, including (1) Was the information given/taken in a for-
mal manner?;
202
 (2) Were the declarant’s statements solemn affirma-
tions?;
203
 (3) Was the declarant doing what a trial witness does?;
204
 (4) 
Did the statement contain the “common nucleus” of “testimonial” 
statements?;
205
 and (5) Was the primary purpose of any questioning to 
gather past facts that would be potentially relevant to a criminal pros-
ecution?
206
  Affirmative answers to any of these questions militate to-
ward finding that the statement was “testimonial.” 
1. The Common Nucleus of “Testimonial” Statements 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court considered adopting the follow-
ing definitions of “testimonial”: 
[(1)] ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that 
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testi-
mony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
 
 200 This Part of the Comment is meant only to be a brief summary of the author’s 
interpretation of the meaning of “testimonial” to support a later argument regarding 
the competency required to make such a statement.  As might be clear by now, how-
ever, the meaning of “testimonial” is somewhat vague and is subject to several inter-
pretations.  For a more in depth treatment of the meaning of “testimonial” see Ri-
chard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553 (2007).  
 201 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004) (refusing to accept any 
of three proffered definitions of “testimonial”); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 822 (2006) (giving guidance about “testimonial” statements only in response to 
police interrogations). 
 202 Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 n.5 (“We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential 
to testimonial utterance.”). 
 203 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 204 Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
 205 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
 206 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 830. 
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pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially; . . . [or (2)] statements that were made under cir-
cumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to be-
lieve that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.
207
 
While it declined to adopt either definition, the Court stated 
that “[t]hese formulations all share a common nucleus and then de-
fine the Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.”
208
  
Considering these two formulations and what they share in common, 
the common nucleus must relate to the speaker’s expectation that his 
statement could be used in a prosecutorial fashion.
209
 
2. The Solemnity Requirement 
In Crawford, the Court also stated that testimony and, thus, a 
“testimonial” statement, is a “‘solemn declaration or affirmation 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”
210
  The 
Court has given examples of what it considers to be solemn declara-
tions, such as when “[a]n accuser . . . makes a formal statement to 
government officers” 
211
 or the police.
212
  The Court has also indicated 
that a solemn declaration is not given when “a person . . . makes a ca-
sual remark to an acquaintance.”
213
 Nor does a person give a solemn 
declaration when he “unwittingly” makes a statement to a govern-
ment informant, notwithstanding the fact that the informant was ga-
thering incriminating information to assist the police in a criminal 
prosecution.
214
 
 
 207 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Crawford Court also considered Justice Thomas’s definition of 
“testimonial” that he put forth in his concurring opinion in White v. Illinois: “extra-
judicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affida-
vits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”  Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 
U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)).  This definition was later rejected by 
the Davis Court as being too narrow in scope and unfaithful to the Framers’ intent.  
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
 208 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
 209 See People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 925 (Colo. 2006) (noting that “the ‘common 
nucleus’ . . . centers upon the declarant’s reasonable expectations”). 
 210 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted). 
 211 Id. 
 212 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826.  See also State ex rel J.A., 949 A.2d 790, 804 (N.J. 
2008), where the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a statement to a police offic-
er was a solemn declaration because there criminal penalties attached to making a 
knowingly false statement and, therefore, were considered “testimonial.” 
 213 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 214 Davis, 547 U.S. at 825 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181–84 
(1987)). 
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A review of those examples demonstrates that even if a statement 
is incriminating, which is possible whether a person makes a remark 
to a government officer, an acquaintance, or an informant, it is only 
considered a “solemn declaration” in the cases where the declarant 
should reasonably know that the recipient of the information holds a 
law-enforcement or other governmental position.  Also present in the 
examples of solemn declarations is the declarant’s reasonable expec-
tation that legal consequences could attach to his statements, both 
for himself and for others about whom he may be speaking.
215
  Absent 
from the situations that are not considered solemn declarations is the 
declarant’s reasonable anticipation that any official consequences 
would result from his statements. 
3. The Formality Requirement 
The formality of the circumstances under which a statement is 
made is also relevant to whether a statement is “testimonial” in na-
ture
216
 because it serves as an indicator to the declarant that a substan-
tial likelihood exists that his statement will be used prosecutorially.  
As the Court explained in Davis, the formality of an interrogation 
makes it “more objectively apparent” that the interrogation was de-
signed to elicit facts about past criminal events.
217
  Part of the reason 
why the statements were considered “testimonial” in Hammon but not 
in Davis is due to the presence of formality in the former “interroga-
tion” and its absence in the latter.
218
  The formality requirement sug-
gests that the “testimonial” nature of a statement depends largely on 
whether circumstances would reasonably lead the speaker to expect 
that his statements might be used as evidence in a criminal prosecu-
tion. 
4. What a Witness Does 
According to the Davis court, those who make “testimonial” 
statements do exactly what a trial witness does.
219
  Trial witnesses an-
 
 215 For example, an affidavit can be used as evidence in some situations, see 3 AM. 
JUR. 2D Affidavits § 19 (2002), and making a false statement in one can subject the 
declarant to penalties.  See 60A AM. JUR. 2D Perjury § 40 (2003). 
 216 Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (“We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to 
testimonial utterance.”). 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at 827, 830.  But see generally Ross, supra note 21. 
 219 Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
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swer questions that are designed to elicit evidence.
220
  The Supreme 
Court explained that “[n]o ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an 
emergency and seek help.”
221
  Framed in this way, it seems that the 
declarant’s purpose in making the statement is relevant and that 
extrajudicial declarants only make “testimonial” statements when the 
impetus behind the statement was to provide evidence of another’s 
guilt. 
5. The Purpose of the “Interrogation” 
The Davis court explained that “when the circumstances objec-
tively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,”
222
 the an-
swers to those questions are “testimonial.”  The Court, however, fol-
lowed that explanation with a footnote stating that “it is in the final 
analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions 
that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”
223
  Although 
some courts have interpreted these lines to mean that the only varia-
ble in the “testimonial” equation is the questioner’s purpose,
224
 a 
more plausible reading is that the questioner’s purpose is relevant 
only to the extent that it would lead the declarant to expect his 
statements to be used prosecutorially.
225
  Thus, this criterion also hints 
that the declarant’s expectations, based on the circumstances sur-
rounding the statement, are the determinative factor in the “testi-
monial” equation. 
C. The Court’s Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Notably, Crawford and its progeny share much in common with 
the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, which supports the no-
tion that the “testimonial” nature of a statement hinges on the decla-
 
 220 See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 1 (2002). 
 221 Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
 222 Id. at 822. 
 223 Id. at 822 n.1.   
 224 See supra note 152; see also United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th 
Cir. 2005); State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2006); State v. Mack, 101 
P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004). 
 225 See, e.g., State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 844 (Ohio 2006) (“In determining 
whether a statement is testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, courts should 
focus on the expectation of the declarant at the time of making the statement; the 
intent of a questioner is relevant only if it could affect a reasonable declarant’s ex-
pectations.”). 
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rant’s reasonable anticipation that it could be used in a subsequent 
criminal trial.  For example, the Court has held that a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
226
 can be successful-
ly invoked by a criminal suspect only when his pretrial statements are 
compelled, incriminating, and testimonial (not in the Crawford 
sense).
227
  If a compelled statement is testimonial (communicative), 
but the suspect does not “reasonably believe[]” that his statements 
can be used against him as evidence in a criminal trial, no Fifth 
Amendment violation occurs.
228
  Thus, to determine whether a Fifth 
Amendment violation has occurred, the Court has focused on wheth-
er the suspect (or the “witness against himself”) had a reasonable be-
lief that his statements would be used as evidence in a subsequent 
criminal trial against him. 
In addition, the Court’s use of the word “interrogation” in Davis 
may be borrowed from a line of Fifth Amendment Miranda
229
 cases in 
which the Court has held that a criminal suspect’s incriminating 
statements are only subject to a Miranda analysis if he has been sub-
ject to an “interrogation.”
230
  Significantly, for Fifth Amendment pur-
poses an interrogation 
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or ac-
tions on the part of police . . . that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect.  The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the per-
ceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.
231
 
Clearly, the perceptions of the suspect are not decisive factors in a 
Miranda analysis.  The Court has held that even when a suspect makes 
incriminating statements to an agent of law enforcement, no viola-
tion occurs if the suspect is unaware that he is being surreptitiously 
“interrogated” and providing incriminating information.
232
 
 
 226 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 227 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 
177, 189–90 (2004).  Testimonial in these cases refers to communicative assertions.  
See supra note 17. 
 228 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 190 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 
(1972)). 
 229 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 230 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981). 
 231 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 232 See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (“Conversations between sus-
pects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda.”). 
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The Court has also held that an exception to a Miranda violation 
exists that is similar to the Davis ongoing emergency rule.  Even if a 
suspect, while being interrogated, has a reasonable belief that his 
statements will be used as evidence against him, no Miranda violation 
occurs when “police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a 
concern for the public safety.”
233
  The Court, however, was careful to 
note that “most police officers [in an emergency situation] would act 
out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable mo-
tives—their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the 
desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect”—but their 
individual motivations are irrelevant to the Fifth Amendment analy-
sis.
234
  Thus, if the Court is using its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence 
as a guide for its Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis, 
then a statement clearly is only “testimonial” when it is reasonable to 
conclude that the declarant should know, based on the context of the 
situation, that his statements could be used in a criminal prosecu-
tion,
235
 unless the statements are given in response to an emergency 
situation that requires immediate resolution for safety reasons. 
D. N.M. Was Not Constitutionally Required to Confront Buda 
1. N.M. Was Not “Testimonially” Competent 
The foregoing criteria suggest that three prerequisites exist for 
making a “testimonial” statement in the context of a question and an-
swer dialogue.
236
  First, a questioner who has actual law-enforcement 
capacity or who can be considered an arm of law enforcement must 
be involved.
237
  Second, the questioner must ask his questions in a 
 
 233 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). 
 234 Id. 
 235 The major difference between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment analyses is that 
under the Fifth Amendment, it is the suspect who must be aware that he is incrimi-
nating himself, while under the Sixth Amendment, the declarant must be aware that 
his statements could be incriminating as to a third party.  
 236 This Comment deals only with situations in which a questioner is involved be-
cause that was the context of the Buda, Davis/Hammon, and Crawford statements; 
however, a “testimonial” statement can be made in other circumstances.  See Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 n.1 (2006). 
 237 Many courts have found that statements made to private individuals, such as 
parents, friends, and doctors are not considered testimonial.  See, e.g., People v. Cage, 
155 P.3d 205, 219 (Cal. 2007) (child’s statement to emergency-room doctor); People 
v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 920–21, 928 (Colo. 2006) (child’s statement to his father); In re 
Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (child’s statement to his moth-
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(somewhat) formal manner.
238
  And finally, the speaker should be 
able to use the context of the situation to recognize that his answers 
could be used in a prosecutorial manner.
239
 
The speaker’s ability to digest the context of the situation is the 
heart of “testimonial” competence.  The value of the contextual crite-
ria mentioned by the Court—such as the formality and solemnity of 
the exchange, the questioner’s law-enforcement role, and the ab-
sence of an ongoing emergency—hinges on the declarant’s recogni-
tion and use of them.  Those criteria lose their value if a declarant 
could not process them.  Thus, N.M., who in all likelihood would not 
be able to appreciate the “testimonial” circumstances of his dialogue 
with Nurudeen, did not make a “testimonial” statement because there 
is very little chance that he was doing “what a witness does”—
knowingly providing potential evidence. 
If a “testimonially” competent person was in N.M.’s place, the 
statements undoubtedly would be considered “testimonial.”  Nuru-
deen was acting as an agent of the prosecutor, her questioning was 
just as, if not more, formal than the questioning in Hammon, and 
N.M. was in no immediate danger.
240
  Nevertheless, the crucial point 
is that N.M. was unable to identify Nurudeen’s law-enforcement pur-
pose, and thus, his words could not be considered “solemn declara-
tions” or testimony.  Although Nurudeen’s questioning might be con-
sidered “formal,” the formality requirement presupposes that the 
declarant has the capacity to understand that formal questioning in-
dicates that the questioner may be attempting to elicit and preserve 
evidence.  That is, the formality requirement hinges on the speaker’s 
ability to recognize a prosecutorial purpose when he sees one. 
 
er); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (adult’s statement to 
doctor); see also Mosteller, supra note 23, at 944–48, 950–57. 
 238 For a critique of the way the Court applied this factor in the Davis and Hammon 
cases, see Ross, supra note 21, at 186–89 (arguing that the questioning in Hammon 
was less formal than that of Davis). 
 239 The idea that whether a statement is “testimonial” hinges on the declarant’s 
anticipation of the statement’s prosecutorial use was advocated by Richard D. Fried-
man in a pre-Crawford article, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay.  
See Friedman, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 247 (explaining that a “testimonial” 
statement is one in which “an out-of-court declarant knows that she is probably pro-
viding evidence toward investigation or prosecution of a crime”).  Courts that follow 
this analysis have also been split over whether to use the perspective of an “objective 
adult” or an “objective child of the same knowledge and understanding.”  See Mostel-
ler, supra note 23, at 976–84. 
 240 See supra Part IV.B–C. 
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While it would be futile to engage in a hypothetical guessing 
game about N.M.’s subjective state of mind when he answered Nuru-
deen’s questions, the circumstantial evidence militates toward finding 
an extremely low probability that he had any idea that his statements 
could or might be used against Buda in a criminal trial: N.M. was 
three years old when he made the statement;
241
 no evidence indicates 
that he had any previous contact with the criminal-justice system or 
DYFS;
242
 he had just been examined by medical professionals who 
were concerned with his injuries;
243
 and given the events of the day, it 
is likely that he was mentally and emotionally exhausted.  Given those 
factors, it would be illogical to conclude that N.M. had the capacity to 
recognize the possibility that his words could or might be used 
against his mother’s boyfriend in a future criminal prosecution.  
Therefore, he was not acting as a witness under Crawford and was not 
constitutionally required to confront Buda.
244
 
2. There Would Be No Value in Requiring Confrontation 
Between N.M. and Buda 
Besides N.M.’s competence, in light of the courage-gathering na-
ture that the Crawford court has assigned to confrontation,
245
 requir-
ing N.M. to face Buda in court would have apparently been fruitless.  
N.M.’s situation does not resemble any of the models of required 
 
 241 State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 765 (N.J. 2008). 
 242 Nothing in the opinion suggests that Christine or N.M. had ever previously 
dealt with DYFS. 
 243 Buda, 949 A.2d at 766. 
 244 Many courts argue that taking an approach similar to the one advocated in this 
Comment could lead to prosecutorial abuse and that interviewers of children could 
flout the Confrontation Clause by asking suggestive and leading questions to incom-
petent children.  See, e.g., State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 328–29 (Md. 2005) (“To 
allow the prosecution to utilize statements by a young child made in an environment 
and under circumstances in which the investigators clearly contemplated use of the 
statements at a later trial would create an exception that we are not prepared to rec-
ognize.”).  But it is important to keep in mind that the prosecution must pass two ob-
stacles before the admission of a hearsay statement—the evidentiary one and the 
constitutional one.  And as Crawford makes clear, the Confrontation Clause is not 
meant to guarantee the substantive reliability of hearsay statements; that is the pur-
pose of the rules of evidence.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) 
(stating that the Confrontation Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but 
that reliability be assessed in a particular manner”).  An unreliable statement or one 
that was elicited by means of suggestive questioning should be considered inadmissi-
ble under the rules of evidence, not because its admission would contravene the 
Confrontation Clause.  
 245 See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
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confrontation mentioned by the Supreme Court, such as Cobham’s 
remarks about Sir Walter Raleigh’s apparent treason
246
 or Amy Ham-
mon’s explanation to the police as to how her husband had beaten 
her.
247
  Present in those model situations is a person who knowingly 
and voluntarily provided government officials with incriminating in-
formation about a party who was not currently present, and thus, the 
declarant assumed the obligations of a witness.
248
  Based on the 
Court’s current jurisprudence, it seems that accusers are required to 
stand by their previous assertions while confronted by the defendant 
in a court of law so that any falsehoods are weaned out.  Also, society 
is likely to look down on individuals who make accusations and then 
“hide behind the shadow.”
249
 
No analogous value would be served by requiring the three-year-
old to face off with Buda and repeat the nonaccusatory statement, 
“‘Dad says no one beat me.  I fell when I was sleeping.’”
250
  N.M. did 
not make a voluntary accusatory statement and then attempt to “hide 
behind the shadow”
251
 but was cast into the role of an evidence giver 
without any knowing and independent choice of his own.  The value 
of confrontation stressed by the Court seems to only make sense 
when an individual voluntarily assumes the role of a witness by kno-
wingly making statements that could be used in an adverse way 
against an accused.
252
  Furthermore, requiring a three-year-old child 
to repeat a nonaccusatory statement in front of his alleged abuser 
would not only be fruitless for confrontation purposes, but it also has 
the potential to reduce the clause to a vehicle to intimidate some 
child victims. 
VI. A PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATION 
Some courts have found children’s statements to be “nontesti-
monial” on grounds related to the notion of “testimonial” compe-
 
 246 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 443. 
 247 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2006). 
 248 See Clark, supra note 72, at 1267. 
 249 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 250 State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 766 (N.J. 2008). 
 251 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 252 See Clark, supra note 72, at 1258 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment ought to be re-understood as primarily an accuser’s obligation rather 
than primarily as a defendant’s right.  We demand that those who would perform 
this potentially dangerous, morally weighty, and symbolically loaded act—the act of 
accusation—be willing to do so face to face.”). 
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tence explored in this Comment.  Without using the phrase “‘testi-
monial’ competence,” these courts have argued that a child’s state-
ment is not “testimonial” because an objective child of the same age 
and understanding would not have anticipated the prosecutorial use 
of the statements.
253
  While that approach is a step in the right direc-
tion, courts preferably should follow the Federal Rules of Evidence 
model so that no age of presumptive “testimonial” incompetence ap-
plies.  While it is extremely unlikely for a very young child to be “tes-
timonially” competent, it is essential to the defendant’s rights that the 
court examine the child so that the court can make a determination 
about whether that particular child reasonably could have anticipated 
how his statements could be used under the circumstances.
254
  Even if 
the child were young, if he appears to have recognized that his state-
ments could be used to get someone in trouble with the law, then he 
should be required to confront the defendant in court. 
The state’s interest in protecting children from physical and 
mental harm and the rights of the criminally accused are of equal 
importance, and it is essential that the judicial system ensure that 
both are given proper protection.  To do so, states should require 
child social-service workers, such as DYFS investigators, to videotape 
their interviews with child-abuse victims.
255
  If a criminal prosecution 
 
 253 See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 926 (Colo. 2006) (“[A]n objective seven-
year-old child would reasonably be interested in feeling better and would intend his 
statements [to a doctor] to describe the source of pain and his symptoms. . . .  He 
would not foresee the statement being used in a later trial.”); State v. Bobadilla, 709 
N.W.2d 243, 255–56 (Minn. 2006) (noting that because the child was only three, “it is 
doubtful that he was even capable of understanding that his statements would be 
used at trial”).  But it should be noted that the Supreme Court mentioned in Craw-
ford that the one case decided under Roberts that might be in conflict with new rule 
set down in Crawford was White v. Illinois, where the Court held that a four-year-old’s 
statements to a police officer were properly received into evidence under an excited-
utterance hearsay exception and did not violate the Confrontation Clause, without 
any showing that the child was unavailable.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 
n.8 (2004) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 349–45 (1992)). While this dictum 
may seem to imply that the four-year-old’s statements were “testimonial,” which 
would cast doubt upon using an objective-child perspective, the Court made it clear 
that the issue in White dealt only with witness unavailability and its relation to the 
Confrontation Clause.  Id. 
 254 For example, a court could possibly conclude that even a young child could 
have anticipated the prosecutorial use of his statements.  See, e.g., State v. Justus, 205 
S.W.3d 872, 880 (Mo. 2006) (“Even at four years old, [the child]—who told [the so-
cial worker] that she would tell a judge what her father had done—was aware that 
her statements could be used to prosecute [her father].”). 
 255 The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that videotaping preliminary 
interviews with child sex-abuse victims is beneficial because it enables judges to de-
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ensues, the court and the prosecutor should make efforts to have the 
child testify at trial.
256
  If the child is deemed incompetent to testify, 
then the pretrial statement should also be deemed “nontestimonial” 
because a child who is unable to undertake the duty and obligations 
of a trial witness could not logically have recognized and assumed 
those duties prior to trial.
257
  In this situation, the videotape should 
then be admitted in lieu of the DYFS worker’s testimony because it 
would be the best evidence available.
258
  Admission of the videotape 
would pose no threat to the defendant’s confrontation right because 
the statement is not “testimonial” and also would serve the twin goals 
of the rules of evidence—allowing the fact finder to determine the 
truth and to have the proceeding conducted in a just manner.
259
  In 
addition, this process reduces any threat of psychological harm that 
may result as a consequence of a child giving testimony in front of his 
alleged abuser.
260
 
If, however, the child is competent to testify but is ruled emo-
tionally unavailable or does not testify for some other reason, it is in-
 
termine the reliability of any elicited statements.  See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 
1379 n.1 (N.J. 1994). 
 256 Some commentators have noted that prosecutors have some influence over 
whether a child is physically available to testify, and therefore, they must make good-
faith efforts to ensure children’s availability.  See Mosteller, supra note 23, at 985–86.  
Steps can also be taken to ensure that a potential child-witness is emotionally availa-
ble.  For example, it is constitutional to allow child-victims to testify via a closed cir-
cuit video system.  See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990).  In addition, there 
are ways to lessen the emotional strain of testifying in court, including (1) having the 
judge appear less intimidating by removing his robe and reassuring the child that he 
is not going to be sent to jail, (2) bringing the child to the courtroom before the tri-
al, (3) explaining the trial and the roles of the various parties, and (4) allowing the 
child to testify by using testimonial aids.  See SHERRIE BOURG CARTER, CHILDREN IN THE 
COURTROOM: CHALLENGES FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 93–98 (2005). 
 257 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.  Curiously, under Roberts, establish-
ing that a child was incompetent to testify at trial would militate toward finding that 
the Confrontation Clause would prohibit the pretrial statement from being admitted 
into evidence because it would appear to lack the requisite indicia of reliability.  See, 
e.g., People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“If a child sexual 
abuse victim is deemed ‘incompetent’ as a witness, a seeming paradox results from 
the attempt to introduce into evidence that child’s out-of-court statements.  It may 
appear incongruous to allow into evidence the statements of someone declared in-
competent to testify to the same events at trial just a few months later.”). 
 258 To justify the admission of this videotape, legislatures and courts would have to 
create an additional hearsay exception on the grounds that the videotape is the best 
and most reliable evidence available. 
 259 FED. R. EVID. 103.  Significantly, this process parallels the historical treatment 
of incompetent child witnesses.  See supra note 191–194 and accompanying text. 
 260 See supra note 52. 
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cumbent upon the court to determine whether the child was “testi-
monially” competent at the time the statement was made.  In this re-
gard, judges might use tort law as a guide for making their rulings.  In 
the law of torts, children are generally held to different standards 
than adults and will be held liable for their negligent or reckless ac-
tions only when they have the capacity to appreciate the inherent risk 
and danger associated with those actions.
261
  Capacity is a factual ques-
tion that can be determined by the age, intelligence, and experience 
of the particular child.
262
  Those same factors should be used by 
judges to determine the likelihood that the child-witness had the ca-
pacity to appreciate that his statement could or might be used in a 
prosecutorial manner. 
There is no denying that this will be a difficult task that will not 
work perfectly, but the use of psychologists and common sense could 
lead to reliable results.  In addition, the videotaped interview could 
prove very useful in aiding the judge’s determination of the child’s 
“testimonial” competence because it allows the judge to factor in the 
setting of the interview, the manner of questioning, and the child’s 
responses to make a determination of whether the child could rea-
sonably anticipate the prosecutorial use of the statements.
263
  If the 
judge concludes based on the foregoing factors that the child was not 
“testimonially” competent at the time the statement was made and 
that the questioning was conducted in a nonleading or suggestive 
manner, then the videotape should be admitted into evidence.
264
  If, 
however, the judge determines that the child was “testimonially” 
competent when he made the statement, then admitting the tape 
without the child’s testimony in court would clearly violate the Con-
frontation Clause and should not be permitted. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Buda opinion demonstrates many of the problems that low-
er courts face when attempting to apply the vague and confusing di-
rectives of Crawford and Davis—problems that become much more 
 
 261 42 AM. JUR. 2d Infants § 133 (2000). 
 262 Id. § 134. 
 263 In addition, a preliminary review of the videotape would allow the judge to de-
termine if the interviewer’s questions were leading, coercive, or suggestive. 
 264 The videotape would be admitted under the newly formed hearsay exception.  
See supra note 258.  Of course, if the questioning is leading or suggestive, it should be 
declared too unreliable to meet the hearsay exception and should not be allowed in-
to evidence. 
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complicated and sensitive when dealing with very young child-abuse 
victims.  Instead of attempting to address the theoretical and practical 
difficulties of the situation, the Buda majority relied on questionable 
reasoning to achieve the result that it desired—avoiding confronta-
tion between a three-year-old and his alleged abuser.  To justify its 
conclusion, the Buda court distorted Nurudeen’s role with law en-
forcement and also stretched the meaning of an “ongoing emergen-
cy” well beyond its common meaning and the definition provided by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Buda majority could have made its decision by focusing on 
N.M.’s competence to make a “testimonial” statement.
265
  Just as po-
tential trial witnesses must possess a certain level of competency be-
fore testifying, extrajudicial declarants must also possess a minimum 
level of competency before they can be assigned the role of “witness.”  
While Crawford and Davis provide opaque instructions on how to 
identify a “testimonial” statement, one essential criterion seems to be 
that the declarant should realize that his statements could be used in 
a subsequent criminal prosecution against a third party.  This re-
quirement presupposes that the declarant has the mental compe-
tence to make such a recognition.  The declarant who is unable to 
recognize the potential prosecutorial use is not making a “testimoni-
al” statement; his statement is much more akin to a casual remark to 
an acquaintance.
266
  N.M., who was three years old and in a hospital 
when he made the statements at issue, was unable to recognize that 
Nurudeen had a prosecutorial purpose when she asked if anyone had 
beaten him, notwithstanding the fact that the circumstances sur-
rounding the dialogue made it clear that she did.  Because his state-
ments were not “testimonial,” the Confrontation Clause posed no bar 
to their admission into evidence. 
While addressing the “testimonial” competence of children is an 
admittedly thorny issue, it is essential that courts make every effort to 
find the delicate balance between the protection of child-victims and 
the rights of the criminally accused.  In this case, however, it seems 
odd and absurd to force N.M. to come face-to-face with the defendant 
to repeat his nonaccusatorial statement.  As the Supreme Court 
stated years ago, “no one would think of calling as a witness an infant 
 
 265 While few, if any, courts have used this terminology in the past, such a holding 
would have drawn much-needed attention to the difficulties in this area of the law. 
 266 See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
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only two or three years old.”
267
  Perhaps, more than anything, Buda 
demonstrates the necessity for more specific guidance on how to ap-
ply the “testimonial” framework to child-abuse victims.  A criminal de-
fendant’s constitutional rights and the state’s interest in protecting 
children from abuse and trauma are far too important to be left up to 
a vague legal doctrine that can be interpreted and applied in a sub-
jective and unpredictable manner. 
 
 
 267 Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895). 
